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This thesis investigates the behavior of Navy enlisted personnel who were
eligible for, and offered, early voluntary separation under one of two monetary
incentive programs during FY 1992. The two programs were the voluntary separation
incentive (VSI) and the special separation bonus (SSB). The purpose is to identify
the factorsjhat influence (1) the voluntary separation decision and (2) the decision
between the two programs. Multivariate logit models were estimated to explain the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAY AS A
"FORCE SHAPING" TOOL
With the recent world changes and the decline in resources devoted to national
defense, the United States is moving toward a smaller military force. For any
organization faced with reducing its size the biggest money savings are achieved
through personnel reductions. According to the Congressional Budget Office,
reducing active duty military personnel by 500,000 would save $103.2 billion over five
years, as compared with only $2.1 billion being saved over five years by the Navy
retiring the four Iowa class battleships. [Ref. 1]
The Department of Defense is facing large scale personnel strength reductions
as required by Section 402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991.
[Ref. 2] Cutbacks in active duty personnel are to be approximately 500,000 between
1989 and 1995, although actual cutbacks could eventually far exceed those currently
planned. Because of the impact of outside events and congressional committees on
final end strength numbers, the services cannot set their own force levels with
assurance. [Ref. 1]
While the U.S. has reduced the size of its military many times in the past, this
is the largest personnel drawdown in the history of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
since its advent in 1973. The Department of Defense is committed to treating all
military volunteers fairly during this force reduction. Because of the volunteer status
of service members, new policies and approaches must be used in this reduction
compared to early ones during conscription periods.
Unlike civilian retirement, military retirement is not vested until an individual
completes 20 years of service. In addition, military retirement begins as soon as a
vested member leaves active duty regardless of age. In an effort to avoid involuntary
separations that would deprive service members of expected retirement benefits, the
Department of Defense is implementing a Voluntary Separations Incentive (VSI) and
Special Separation Benefit (SSB) to induce selected members to resign prior to
becoming retirement eligible. [Ref. 3]
The required 15 percent drawdown of active duty Naval personnel is being
accomplished primarily through reduced accessions and normal attrition. Because
of the numerous organization-specific skills required by the military, the military
represents an internal labor market. Thus, unlike private companies that can rely on
lateral transfer hires, military manpower must be home-grown. [Ref. 1] Excessive
reductions in force achieved primarily through reduced accessions would worsen
current imbalances in the structure of the force in terms of years of service, grade
and skill levels. Increased imbalances could result in promotion stagnation, skill
shortages, and higher personnel costs. [Ref. 4] Even with successful use of reduced
accessions and other administrative measures, some additional nonvested service
members, otherwise suitable to continue on active duty, will have to leave the service.
As the force is reduced, one goal is to treat service members fairly. The
challenge will be to reshape the force so that personnel inventories and quality levels
match the requirements of the new smaller force structure. [Ref. 4] The "force
shaping" concept deals with targeting specific pay grades, ratings and length of service
cells to ensure there are no future skill or experience shortages in each cell. The
"career force" is considered to be service members with six to 20 years of service. As
personnel cuts become more likely, excess personnel will have to be squeezed out of
the career force. Force shaping ensures promotion opportunities for those allowed
to enter the career force. It also allows accessions to remain at sustaining levels,
which keeps the force from becoming "hollow."
Policy guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force
Management and Personnel (ASD(FM&P)), Christopher Jehn, provided to the
Service Secretaries on 3 January 1992, stated that, "The VSI/SSB shall be used
extensively to minimize involuntary separations and to shape the force during the
drawdown of the active force." [Ref. 5] The use of VSI/SSB in the Navy thus far
has been limited primarily to avoiding involuntary separations and to structuring
specific skill areas.
B. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF VOLUNTARY SEPARATION
INCENTIVE (VSI) AND SPECIAL SEPARATION BENEFIT (SSB)
PROGRAMS
Congress authorized VSI/SSB in the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 1992 effective January 1, 1992. Specific procedures for eligibility, implementation
and payment of VSI/SSB benefits are described below.
1. Eligibility for VSI/SSB
The Secretary of the Navy may offer a member of the Navy the oppor-
tunity to apply for VSI/SSB if the member meets the following criteria:
a. Has served on active duty for more than 6 years before December 5, 1991
and has completed his initial term of enlistment or initial period of obligated
service prior to separation;
b. Has served at least 5 years of continuous active duty immediately preceding
the date of separation;
c. Upon separation is not immediately eligible for retired or retainer pay based
on his military service;
d. Is a Regular member, or if a Reserve, is on an active duty list; and
e. Meets such other requirements as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe
from time to time, which may include requirements relating to years of
service, skill or rating, grade or rank, and remaining period of obligated
service.
2. Application for VSI/SSB
Service members meeting the eligibility criteria may request to separate
from active duty and accept an appointment or enlistment in, or transfer to, the
Naval Reserve.
3. Approval for VSI/SSB
Eligible Service members are not automatically entitled to receive
VSI/SSB based solely on their request. The Secretary of the Navy reviews all
applications for voluntary separation and approves only those consistent with the
"needs" of the Navy.
4. Methods of Payments, Benefits, and Reserve Obligation
a. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)
(1) A Service member who is approved for separation under the
VSI program is paid an amount equal to 2.5 percent of his or her monthly basic pay
on the date appointed, enlisted, or transferred to the Naval Reserve, multiplied by
twelve and multiplied again by his or her years of active service (YOS). Thus, the
annual payment is calculated as follows:
Annual VSI Payment = 2.5 percent x final monthly basic pay x 12 months x YOS
(2) Service members who are approved for VSI are paid in annual
installments commencing on their departure from active duty, and on each
anniversary date thereafter. The total number of payments equals twice the number
of years of active duty service, provided the member continues to serve in the Naval
reserve for the duration of the payments.
Members who are entitled to voluntary separation incentive
payments who subsequently receive basic pay, compensation for inactive duty
training, or disability compensation must forfeit an equal amount of the voluntary
separation incentive pay.
Members entitled to receive voluntary separation pay who
subsequently qualify for retired pay or retainer pay will have deducted a portion of
that retired or retainer pay equal to the VSI received. VSI annual payments will be
discontinued if the member is separated from the Naval reserve, unless one of the
following conditions applies:
(a) In the event of the Service member's death, full VSI
annual payments will continue to the Service member's beneficiaries.
(b) In the event the Service member becomes ineligible to
continue to serve in the Naval reserve due to medical, age, failure to select for
promotion, or other reasons determined to be no fault of the member concerned, the
member will be transferred to the Standby Reserve or the Retired Reserve of the
Naval Reserve. The Service member will continue to receive annual VSI payments
for the remaining period authorized, with applicable adjustments as may be required
as provided below in paragraph 5.
b. Special Separation Benefit (SSB)
(1) A Service member approved for separation under the SSB
program is paid a lump sum equal to fifteen percent of the monthly basic pay
received on the date of his or her separation, multiplied by twelve and multiplied
again by his or her years of active service. Thus, the lump sum payment is
calculated as follows:
Lump sum = 15 percent x final monthly basic pay x 12 montlis x YOS
(2) Service members who are approved for SSB are eligible for the
same transition benefits and services as members who are involuntarily separated, as
provided for in Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P) memorandum dated June 7,
1991, "Policy Changes for Transition Assistance Initiatives, as amended."
(3) Service members who are approved for SSB will enter into a
written agreement with the Secretary of the Navy to serve in the Naval reserve for
a period of not less than 3 years following their separation from active duty. If the
service member has a service obligation that is not completed at the time the
member is separated from active duty, the 3 year obligation will begin on the day
after the day the member completes his or her obligation.
(4) Regular enlisted members eligible for SSB will submit their
requests for separation under this program before the expiration of their term of
enlistment or, upon discharge, enter into a written agreement not to request
reenlistment in a regular component.
(5) Members of the Navy, other than regular members, who are
eligible for SSB will submit their request for separation under this program before
the expiration of their term of active service.
5. Service members approved for separation under VSI/SSB are required
to separate on or before September 30, 1995 [Ref. 5]
These incentive programs provide the services with the flexibility to
accomplish the following: reduce involuntary separations; maintain accessions at
sustaining levels; align inventories with skill, grade and experience requirements;
meet guidelines for promotion opportunity; and provide flexibility to respond to
future unforeseen structure changes. [Ref. 4]
C. FOCUS OF THESIS
As the Navy is reduced and reshaped, a major challenge will be to maintain a
high state of readiness and still treat Navy service members fairly. Success in
meeting this challenge will ultimately determine the impact of the drawdown on the
future force. [Ref. 4] By making effective use of the voluntary separation incentive
programs, any adverse effects of the drawdown on service members can be reduced,
if not eliminated.
The purpose of the analysis in this thesis is to develop a method of estimating
the acceptance rate for the two separation programs. The thesis focuses specifically
on the results of VSI/SSB offerings made to enlisted members of the Navy during
FY 1992 in the four completed rounds. It analyzes and discusses projected outcomes
of the offerings and compares the projected and actual outcomes. Information
received through empirical analysis of data from the completed rounds will be used
to develop a model that may be useful in predicting the "take rate" for those who
may be offered the separation incentive programs in the future. The hope is that the
information developed here will help manpower planners target separation bonus and
make VSI/SSB a more effective force shaping tool.
The remainder of the thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II introduces
the concept of drawdown in both the corporate world and in the military. This
chapter reviews the literature relevant to the theory of personnel reduction. Most
studies that have focused on drawdown relate to the civilian sector. Since a military
drawdown of this magnitude in the environment of the All-Volunteer Force is
unprecedented, the military literature reviewed deals with the Selective Reenlistment
Bonus (SRB) as a possible indicator of the effect that monetary separation bonuses
will have on separation behavior.
Chapter III presents the data and methodology used to study the effects of the
voluntary separation incentive programs on the choices of Navy enlisted personnel.
The strengths and weaknesses of the micro-level data are discussed as well as the
restrictions or limitations imposed on the data for this analysis. The theoretical
model chosen is explained and is used to specify an empirical estimating model. The
categories of specific variables include demographic attributes of the enlisted
personnel, Navy experience and background factors, and the availability of the
separation incentive.
Chapter IV presents the results of the statistical analysis of the data.
Multivariate logit regression models are estimated to obtain the direction and
magnitude of the effect of each explanatory variable on the decision to accept/reject
a voluntary separation incentive when it is offered. These models estimate the
partial effect of the separation bonus program on the probability of acceptance,
holding constant other factors, among service members who are eligible for the
bonus.
Chapter V presents the development and analysis of a forecasting model to
better predict "take rate" among individuals offered VSI/SSB. Alternative
econometric models will be evaluated in terms of "goodness of fit" and other
statistical measures to determine the most accurate model to be used for forecasting
purposes.
Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the research and draws conclusions
based on those findings. Policy recommendations are also presented based on the
forecasting model developed through the research in this thesis.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis is primarily concerned with determining which factors most
significantly influence the individual's decision to accept a voluntary separation
incentive program. Other concerns include:
Are there variables which can be used to develop a valid forecasting model
of the "take-rate" for future program offerings of VSI/SSB and possible
insight into a more effective incentive program?
Are the VSI/SSB programs successful and cost-effective force shaping tools,
given results of the completed rounds?
Is the increased retention currently being experienced by the Navy an
artificial effect occurring because personnel are waiting for the program to
be offered at their YOS level, and what effect, if any will this have on
projections on the "take rate" of future offerings?
If future uses of voluntary separation incentive programs are needed beyond
FY 1995, could VSI/SSB be used again successfully, considering the
possibility that all those interested in such programs would have already




There are two reasons that explain why research on military downsizing efforts
is scarce: first, current downsizing efforts are unprecedented for the All-Volunteer
Force, which since 1973 has been primarily concerned with recruiting and retaining
personnel; second, all past military demobilizations have dealt primarily with
volunteers and draftees who were eager to return to civilian life after completing
their military service in a specific conflict [Ref. 6:p. 129]. Fortunately, however
literature is available that can provide information and insight into the impact of the
specific reduction strategies being used in the current downsizing of the
All-Volunteer Force.
The first source is civilian research on organizational decline, which is emerging
as one of the most important areas being addressed by organizational researchers
[Ref. 7:p. 3]. Environmental demands have led to the restructuring of many
organizations through reconfiguring work flows, modifying communications and
reporting channels, and downsizing the work force [Ref. 6:p. 30]. The increased use
of downsizing as a form of adaptation to environmental constraints by organizations
has caused an upsurge in the literature describing the phenomenon of work force or
personnel reduction [Ref. 6:p. 1]. Many new terms have appeared in the
organizational literature to describe this trend, including; reduction-in-force (RIF),
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downsizing, demassing, decruitment, retrenchment and build-down. The second area
of research that will be utilized deals with the effect of military financial incentives
and benefits, specifically the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, on
retention decisions. The SRB program has been used extensively by the military to
successfully regulate the experience levels and skill-mix of the career force, i.e., as
a force shaping tool [Ref. 8], Because of the program's proven success, SRB research
will be useful in identifying relationships between, and the effects of, variables
involved in decisions to stay or leave the military under monetary separation
incentive programs.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
American manufacturing, "high-tech," steel and automobile industries have seen
serious declines and the loss of millions of jobs in the past twelve years [Ref. 7].
Until recently, decline was viewed as a sign of a weak or failing organization by
researchers. Most existing organizational theories supported this view with
explanations of organizational effectiveness only in terms of growth. Unfortunately,
growth is no longer inevitable.
Today's organizations are being driven by shrinking markets and overseas
competition to implement downsizing actions to keep their organizations "current"
and competitive. Decline is no longer being viewed by theorists as evidence of
ineffectiveness, but rather as part of the normal life cycle of an organization [Ref. 6].
In addition to being a response to economic pressures, downsizing may also occur as
a proactive strategy to improve organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
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1. Management of the Reduction Process
The literature distinguishes between proactive and reactive responses by
management to the downsizing process. The ability of management to handle the
responsibilities of the reduction will determine how productive the organization will
be when it emerges from the process [Ref. 9:p. 349]. Reactive responses are usually
driven by the need for short-term cost savings without regard to long-term
implications for the organization or its employees [Ref. 6:p. 7]. It is generally
agreed upon by organizational researchers that a proactive response is the most
successful approach for the health of the organization and in minimizing negative
impacts on employees. Inasmuch as proactive adaptation begins early in the
downsizing process, by definition, the organization has more time to plan; and as a
result, more down-sizing strategies become available to them. [Ref. 6:p. 13]
Of all the responsibilities facing management during a work force reduc-
tion, a fundamental dilemma is deciding whether to favor equity or efficiency.
Across-the-board cuts are attractive for short-term cost savings and enable
management to avoid equity issues when selecting specific targets. However, if large
cuts are required, an across-the-board strategy could irreparably damage the
effectiveness of the organization. [Ref. 9:p. 349] Concerns about job security,
coupled with shifts in overall organizational strategy, can build feelings of permanent
insecurity and reduce employee commitment if the reduction is not perceived as
equitable. The manner in which the organization terminates personnel will have a
direct effect on those terminated, but also will influence the behavior and attitudes
of those who survive. [Ref. 6:p. 42] Maintaining morale is a major responsibility of
management during the downsizing process because of the devastating effect
reductions-in-force have on employees who remain. [Ref. 9:p. 349]
As Table 1 shows, most companies that engage in downsizing activities pay
a heavy price in terms of reduced employee morale. Another factor affecting morale
is that work force reductions seldom are a one time occurrence: an average of 63
percent of companies that downsize in a given year will do so again the following
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MORALE, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFITS






Declined 77 28 24
Remained Constant 17 36 23
Increased 2 31 44
Source: [Ref. 10:p. 4]
year [Ref. 10:p. 4]. As morale, job security and commitment to the organization
decline, the best people, who are by definition the most mobile, will leave the
organization [Ref. 9:p. 349]. Also, because downsizing is frequently based on the
need to make deep cuts in payroll costs rather than on improving the overall
employee quality level, good performers along with weak ones will lose their jobs
[Ref. ll:p. 50].
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It is also the responsibility of management to continue to attract and keep
quality employees during the downsizing process. An organization concerned with
maintaining the morale, commitment and effectiveness of remaining employees may
attempt less drastic downsizing strategies before turning to more extreme actions.
In many cases, the use of voluntary separations may in fact eliminate the need for
involuntary dismissals [Ref. 6:p. 19].
Additional responsibilities for management during the downsizing include
keeping the reduction process innovative and developing support from sources of
influence outside of the organization. For an organization involved in downsizing,
the natural tendency will be to act conservatively. However, organizations faced with
downsizing will find opportunities and resources are more available if they can be
flexible and innovative. [Ref. 9:p. 350] If time and circumstances allow, the
organization should strive to be as proactive in its approach to downsizing as
possible.
Relationships with outside support structures are important to decisions
on where to make the required cuts. The functions and units that the organization
wishes to retain or strengthen will need continued outside support from current
sources, or if necessary, development of new outside support. [Ref. 9:p. 350]
2. Strategies for Reducing Personnel
Which strategy an organization will use to reduce personnel is central to
the success of downsizing. It is also a central concern of this thesis. Are monetary
15
separation incentive programs the most equitable and effective way to downsize the
All-Volunteer Force?
Organizations that respond to environmental contingencies with
reductions-in-force have a number of possible strategies depending upon
considerations such as the length of time available to implement a strategy and
monitor the outcome. Those that can be proactive in response to environmental
demands have more options to choose from due to longer time frames and greater
availability of resources. However, other important issues may limit possible
downsizing strategies, including the organization's philosophy, legal constraints, and
other influences outside the organization. A final consideration in the choice of
downsizing strategies is the impact of various strategies on terminated and surviving
employees. Again because of the time factor, a proactive organization will be more
likely to consider strategy choice consequences and plan for possible outcomes. [Ref.
6:p. 42]
There are two general means of removing people from the payroll - either
"pushing" or "pulling" them away [Ref. ll:p. 193]. "Push" strategies are the most
direct, i.e., layoffs. In most cases layoffs do not make sense. They are high-cost
rather than least-cost when looked at from the perspective of economics, legalities,
and employee morale, and tend to harm organization-society relations. Most of the
arguments against layoffs in fact come from morale and moral issues. [Ref. 12:p.
358]
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Ideally, the selection of those to terminate should be based on each
individual's performance and consideration of his or her potential contribution to the
leaner, downsized organization. These decisions also must take into account the
impact of different policies on the treatment of long-service, minority and female
employees. [Ref. ll:p. 193]
"Pull" strategies produce less focused results, but are also less harsh. They
generally involve offering, for a limited time, some inducement, early retirement or
cash payment, to all or to a subgroup of employees encouraging them to resign
voluntarily. Offering lump-sum buy-outs to those not eligible for retirement
programs is also becoming common, although most organizations rely on retirement
efforts because these pull away the higher paid employees, who are slowing down or
blocking advancement opportunities for junior employees. [Ref. ll:p. 195] "Pull"
strategies are sometimes linked with "push" approaches. The letter that invites
personnel to consider early retirement or a buy-out may also warn of involuntary
layoffs if the voluntary departure quotas are not met, (e.g., the "RIF hammer" behind
VSI/SSB offers in the Army, and to a lesser extent the Air Force).
The simplest way to reduce the cost and pain of downsizing is to develop
options to layoffs, whether they be voluntary or forced. A number of alternatives
exist, as outlined in Figure 1, which show the sensible approach depends on both the
magnitude of the reduction and the amount of lead time [Ref. ll:p. 199].
For companies that need to reduce payroll by fifteen percent or more
almost immediately, few options are available other than deep, across-the-board
17
terminations. Luckily, relatively few organizations are in need of such a drastic
turnaround. When immediate action needs to be taken but the magnitude of the
reduction is less than fifteen percent, more options become available and dismissals
can be more selective. [Ref. ll:p. 202]
Selective dismissals mobilize a downsizing mechanism most companies
already have in place: their performance review system. Performance ratings can
be an input into decisions about forced dismissals, which should help to avoid the
equity issue. But for performance ratings to be useful they must also provide valid
information. Many do not because the systems are undermanaged or are used
primarily to make salary decisions, not to correct performance problems. [Ref. ll:p.
203]
The more time a company has to execute its downsizing plan, the more
options that are available to reduce the work force and limit the need for costly and
painful layoffs. The time available is sometimes limited by events outside the
organization's immediate control, but more often than not these events can be
anticipated and dealt with on the company's schedule, not the outside world's [Ref.
ll:p. 205]. Figure 1 shows that greater reductions or cost savings are possible using
these methods if they are managed over a longer period of time. Allowing more
time permits the results of training and retraining investments to pay off [Ref. ll:p.
207].
18
Time Required for Implementation
% Cut Less than 1
Year
1-3 Years 3 Years
15 + • Deep across-the-
board termina-
tions.
• Spin off business
units.








based on skill of
surplus
employees.




ted work back in-
house.














• Spin off staff
departments.













many of the other
options).
Note:
Figure 1. Alternative approaches to downsizing depending
on time available and size of required cut.
Percentages indicate the approximate head-count or payroll reduction
needed. Source: [Ref. 11]
Training investment is one of the biggest hidden costs associated with
downsizing. Typically hard to quantify, it is incurred when a business loses many of
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its managers and staff professionals. Over the years, these people have acquired
what economist Oliver Williamson calls company-specific skills [Ref. ll:p. 198].
These skills are learned on the job, and encompass what it takes to get things done
within a specific company environment. The hardest of these skills to transfer are
those related to effective collaborative relationships that allow things to get done
through personal trust, not bureaucratic procedures. [Ref. ll:p. 198]
Although reduction-in-force strategies usually directly affect only a small
percentage of a firm's total work force, they have permanent consequences for the
entire organization. When done repeatedly, reductions give false comfort about job
security to remaining employees. Because of the impact on morale, quick strategies
are often preferred to attrition, since attrition works over a longer time period [Ref.
ll:p. 203]. Attrition, however, coupled with hiring freezes has helped many
organizations slim down and should not be written off too quickly. In addition, there
are ways to hasten attrition and thus make it a more viable realignment strategy.
[Ref. 12:p. 364]
Many firms use early-retirement incentives to trim burdensome payrolls.
The logic is that employees who are considering retirement anyway will choose to
leave the firm when enticed to do so [Ref. 12:p. 364]. A problem with early
retirement incentives, however, is that outcomes are very unpredictable. Logic does
not always prevail in the complex decision by an employee to leave a firm. Firms
almost always lose some of their "stars" when they offer early retirement. [Ref. 12:p.
364]
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Among the actions companies take to alleviate work force reductions,
early retirement incentives and voluntary separation plans show a definite upward
trend. [Ref. 10:p. 3] Policies that seek to "share the pain" (shortened work weeks,
frozen or reduced salaries) are on the decline. This trend is shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2. ACTIONS TO REDUCE LAYOFFS
Action July 1989 June 1992
Hiring freeze 62.8 61.6
Demotions/transfer 44.1 44.2
Salary reduction/ freeze 46.2 35.1
Early retirement incentive 19.3 34.3
Voluntary separation plan 19.5 28.6
Voluntary job sharing 11.0 15.8
Mandatory short work week/day 24.1 15.3
Limited duration furlough N/A 13.8
(Percents are of firms that downsized)
Source: [Ref. 10:p. 3]
3. Summary
Research shows that organizations that respond to environmental contin-
gencies with reductions-in-force have a number of strategies to choose from, and that
the length of time available to implement and monitor those strategies is a critical
consideration in the choice. Organizations that are proactive in response to
environmental demands may have more options to choose from due to longer time
frames and greater available resources. However, certain issues may limit possible
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downsizing strategies, including the organization's philosophy, legal constraints and
outside influences. Another important consideration in the choice of downsizing
strategies is the impact of various strategies on terminated and surviving employees.
[Ref. 6:p. 42]
When a decision to downsize is followed by proactive planning, the
organization will more likely achieve its goals. Part of proactive planning is to
conduct an evaluation of the organization's needs for achieving its objectives and
improving organizational effectiveness. This evaluation can determine what positions
or functions should be cut when reductions are to be made. If objectives are not
clear with regard to future needs, the results of downsizing are usually negative.
[Ref. 6:p. 21]
Well-managed organizational downsizing can have several positive conse-
quences for the organization that clearly improve organizational effectiveness,
including decreased costs and increased efficiency. Problems may occur with early
retirement and buy-out strategies if management underestimates the percentage of
employees that take advantage of the benefits. The organization may go over budget
or allow too many critical employees to leave. [Ref. 6:p. 74]
Organizations getting the most mileage out of personnel reductions have
broader objectives than simple job elimination. For them, the overall goal is to build
the most efficient and effective organization they can. While they plan the
downsizing, these organizations choose among a wide range of objectives and tactics.
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One main objective of successful organizations is to come out of the downsizing with
a strong and committed workforce. [Ref. ll:p. 59]
Downsizing can result in negative consequences for the mental well-being
of terminated and surviving employees. The organization's treatment of terminated
personnel will largely determine the commitment of those who survive and its image
for future employees. The most noticeable way an organization can prevent possible
negative consequences of its downsizing strategy decisions is to provide information
and intervention for terminated and surviving employees, and for the surrounding
community. [Ref. 6:p. 79]
C. DECLINE IN THE MILITARY
Although public sector agencies have different goals and reward systems than
civilian organizations, growth is still an important objective they share. In the past,
the bigger an agency and its budget, and the more rapid its growth, the more success-
ful it was considered to be. Because of new fiscal realities retrenchment is
confronted at all levels of government, and bureaus can no longer assume they will
be allocated an increasing or even constant share of available resources. [Ref. 9:p.
348]
The United States has reduced the size of its military many times in the past;
however, because of the volunteer status of today's service members, the current
reduction is being planned and implemented with new strategies and policies in mind.
In particular, an effort is being made to avoid involuntary separations that could
deprive some service members of expected retirement benefits. With an eye toward
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the goal of fairness, the Department of Defense is implementing programs designed
to induce selected members to resign voluntarily prior to becoming retirement-
eligible. [Ref. 3]
Past demobilizations help identify four issues concerning the design,
implementation, and follow-up of demobilization that are relevant to the current
reduction-in-force. First, demobilization plans should be coordinated with specific
end-strength objectives. The build-down should facilitate maintaining a force with
the proper mix of officer, enlisted, active and reserve manpower, and with the
knowledge, skills and abilities required to meet national objectives. [Ref. 6:p. 125]
Second, demobilizations involve a significant public relations component.
Public perception of the fairness of the implementation of the downsizing process
and the targeting of specific groups to separate could have a profound effect on the
success of the process.
A third consideration for future military objectives and appropriations is the
direct impact of the demobilization on the relationship between the legislative branch
and the military. Congressional mandates related to military affairs. Finally,
demobilization plans should be consistent and fully communicated to all ranks of
personnel, since directly or indirectly all personnel will be affected. [Ref. 6:p. 126]
For reductions to be effective, downsizing efforts must identify precise targets.
Literature identifies three possible targeting strategies: 1) target specific functions
and positions, 2) implement across-the-board reductions, and 3) target certain
locations [Ref. 6:p. 127]. The first strategy applies to specific jobs, organizational
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departments, or levels. Across-the-board downsizing refers to uniform reductions
throughout the organization, while the targeting of locations confines the reduction-
in-force to specific sites or facilities. These target decisions are associated with
varying degrees of proactive management. Targeting functions and positions
generally reflects a more proactive approach, while across-the-board strategies are
more reactive. The focus of this thesis is to determine the usefulness of
monetary incentive programs in effectively reducing the All-Volunteer Force to meet
required end strength levels, while ensuring proper quality and skill mix of personnel,
i.e., force shaping. Force shaping means pursuing policies that ensure personnel
force structures evolve in accordance with manpower requirements. [Ref. 13:p. 19]
This thesis will review the selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) program as a model
of the effectiveness of a monetary incentive program and to determine what role
monetary incentive programs should play in force shaping.
1. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program
With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the focus of military
personnel policy turned toward meeting military manpower requirements through the
retention of highly trained personnel. In this setting, SRBs became an important
element in a system of financial and non-financial incentives designed to make active
military service more attractive. From 1974 to 1985, SRB expenditures for all
uniformed services increased almost four fold, but still only accounted for 2.3 percent
of total military compensation. [Ref. 14:p. 4]
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The SRB program was designed specifically to offer an attractive
monetary reenlistment incentive to improve manning in critical occupations.
Research has found SRBs to be very effective in improving retention in particular
skills; as bonuses increase, reenlistments increase and extensions fall. [Ref. 15 :p. 26]
Bonuses have successfully been used to shape the career force in terms of both size
and skill composition. Other studies also suggest that this use of bonuses need not
affect the number of personnel who continue on toward retirement eligibility, as
many of those influenced by bonuses to stay an extra term are likely to leave upon
completion of that obligation. This implies that increased use of bonuses at the first
and second terms would likely result in a smaller portion of people entering the
over- 10 year group, enabling SRBs to be more effectively used to shape force
structure. [Ref. 13 :p. 19]
The SRB program is effective because of the ability to allocate funds
specifically to prevent manpower shortages in occupations critical to the readiness
of the force. [Ref. 16:p. iii] Many criteria are considered before a particular
occupation is included in or excluded from the SRB program. Among these factors
are: career manning requirements and projected inventory, costs of formal school
training for replacement personnel, expected increase in retention if a bonus is
offered, priority of the skill in terms of the overall mission of the service. [Ref. 17:p.
14]
General eligibility requirements for service members include; (1) having
completed at least 21 continuous months but not more than 14 years of active Naval
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service, (2) being eligible to reenlist or extend for three or more years in the regular
Navy as specified in the MILPERSMAN, (3) not being entitled to or have not been
paid readjustment, severance or separation pay, (4) being a petty officer or E-3
designated striker, and (5) being qualified for, and serving in a SRB rating/NEC, or
being approved by COMNAVMILPERSCOM for the SCORE program or lateral
conversion to a SRB eligible rating.
The SRB amount is computed as follows: Base pay x additional
OBLISERV(in months) / 12 x Award level. [Ref. 18] The size of the bonus
multiplier is set by the SRB Project Manager, based on recommendations of the
Enlisted Community Managers. Bonus multipliers, or award levels, which range from
to 5, vary across zones, length of service and NECs. Zone eligibility criteria are
as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3. SRB ZONE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Zone Completed at least But not more than
A 21 months 6 years
B 6 years 10 years
C 10 years 14 years
Source: [Ref. 18]
A service member may only receive one Zone A, one Zone B, and one Zone C
bonus during a career. The current ceiling set by Congress on an SRB award is
45,000 dollars, however the Navy has set its maximum award at 30,000 dollars. The
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average bonus being currently paid is 6,062. SRBs are paid one half lump sum at the
time of reenlistment, and the remainder is paid in equal installments on the
anniversary dates of the reenlistment.
The manner in which the reenlistment bonus is paid has been found to
be important to reenlistment rates. In particular, lump sum bonus effects are
significantly different from the effects of installment bonuses and have a greater
impact on the reenlistment rate than that of installment bonuses. [Ref. 16:p. 30] A
study by Hosek and Peterson confirmed that lump sum bonuses are almost twice as
effective in reducing the extension rate, and increasing reenlistment. Empirical
results for the first term show lump sum bonuses produce greater increases in
reenlistment and retention rates than installment bonuses of equal nominal size.
[Ref. 16:p. 41]
Reenlistment bonuses are effective in increasing the reenlistment rate,
decreasing the extension rate and increasing the retention rate. This pattern implies
that higher reenlistment bonuses can increase the expected man years of active duty
service. Lump sum bonuses, which have larger effects on those rates, produce
greater expected man years than installment bonuses. [Ref. 16:p. 52]
Results of a study by Lempe indicate that significant differences exist
between the factors affecting career intent across occupational categories. [Ref. 15 :p.
31] For example, Lempe shows that eligibility for an SRB increases the probability
of reenlistment for electronic technicians by 9.2%, but will have no effect on the
retention of medical and dental personnel. The difference may be caused by
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opportunities awaiting electronics technicians in the private sector relative to those
waiting for medical and dental personnel. [Ref. 15:p. 91]
Large variations among ratings with regard to career intent and reactions
to different bonus levels were also found in research by Siggerud. Civilian job
opportunities and perception of ease with which civilian employment could be
obtained after separation were given as reasons for leaving the military in associated
occupational groups. [Ref. 19:p. 106]
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) approach was used by Cymrot
to study the relationship between reenlistment bonuses and retention for enlisted
Marines. He predicted that increases in the bonus multiple would lead to an
increase in reenlistment, other things equal. Bonus payments were found to have a
significant impact on retention and reenlistment rates of enlisted Marines in the
Cymrot study. [Ref. 8:p. 60] The magnitude of the effect of reenlistment bonuses
also has been shown to vary widely among occupational groups (Lempe).
2. Summary
The design, implementation, and follow-up of downsizing programs
discussed in the military downsizing literature are similar to those discussed by
civilian researchers. Important considerations addressed in research on the SRB
program equally apply to the use of the VSI/SSB programs in the current
reduction-in-force. These considerations include, coordinating national objectives
with end-strength objectives, and maintaining a force with identified knowledge, skill
and experience levels required to meet those objectives.
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In both civilian and military research the effects of societal-organizational
relations on the ability of the organization to manage the downsizing process in a
proactive and rational manner are discussed. A specific consideration in military
research was the relationship between the military and Congress. The issues of
employee morale and employees' perceptions of the fairness of the process and
feelings of job security were shown to greatly affect the success of the downsizing
process both in the civilian and military sectors. Research on the SRB program has
confirmed the impact of monetary incentive programs on the decision by the service
member to remain in the military. Similarities in the design, implementation and
structure of the SRB program and the VSI/SSB program imply that results of
analysis on the SRB program could be utilized to make inferences about the
VSI/SSB program and its effect on the decision to leave the military. These
inferences will be used as a starting point in the analysis to narrow the field of
independent variables and, ultimately, to determine the effectiveness of the overall
monetary separation incentive concept and the specific impacts of either the
installment or lump sum bonus programs.
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Data on the population of bonus eligibles was obtained from ADP (PERS-10)
through the Enlisted Program Manager (PERS-221) in Washington, D.C The data
set was created by combining the set of Naval enlisted personnel who were eligible
for the four rounds of VSI/SSB offerings in FY92 with information on individuals
who accepted and were approved for separation under one of the separation
incentive programs. The merged data set contains 34032 observations and 48
variables.
Simple correlation analysis was conducted to determine correlates ofACCEPT
and CHOICE, the dependent variables, and to check for potential multicollinearity
problems among the independent variables. Also, frequencies and cross-tabulations
were run as a descriptive analysis of all the variables.
The data set is defined and restricted by program eligibility requirements. The
VSI/SSB program was offered to a specific group of enlisted service members.
Eligibility requirements are listed for each of the four FY92 rounds in Appendix A.
Generally, the restrictions were based on length of service, paygrade and rating, with
some further specific restrictions listed for critical NECs.
The length of service window in the first phase had a maximum of 16 years for
all ratings, with the lower limit ranging from 10 to 15 years depending on the specific
31
rating. In each of the next three rounds this window was widened to make a larger
group of service members eligible. In the second round primarily the lower limits
were adjusted downward for the majority of eligible ratings. In the third phase all
upper limits were increased to 17 years of service and lower limits were dropped to
10 for the majority of eligible ratings. The length of service window was maintained
at 10 to 17 years for the majority of ratings in the fourth round.
The length of service (LOS) variable is used in the empirical analysis even
though the eligibility requirements have restricted the potential variation in this
factor. It is assumed that, given the 10 to 17 year window, there is sufficient
variation in the LOS variable to influence the dependent variable. In this analysis
the four phases could not be separated for individual analysis. Thus, the data is an
aggregate over the entire time period of FY92 indicating average behavior of the
four phases. It is believed that this average will yield similar results in terms of
direction and magnitude of effect that individual phase analysis would yield.
Paygrade was limited by eligibility requirements to E5 or E6, which coincides
with length of service limitations. Because paygrade is restricted to E5 or E6 the
variable for paygrade (PRESPG) is expected to show minimal variation. However,
even though there is only a one paygrade difference, the PRESPG variable will be
used in the analysis because of the importance paygrade plays in targeting those
groups that will be offered separation incentives. PRESPG will be changed into a
dummy variable (PAYGRADE) with E6 being equal to one. The effect of paygrade
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is expected to be negative, indicating that the service member higher in grade will
be less likely to accept separation under either program.
Eligible ratings were chosen based upon current manning levels and projected
manning requirements. The ratings targeted by enlisted manpower planners are
either currently overmanned or projected to be overmanned in the future. Of the
total number of Navy ratings, 56 were targeted for inclusion in the FY92 offerings.
For the purpose of analysis, ratings were classified into seven occupational groupings
and a dummy variable was constructed for each. The ratings included in each
grouping are shown in Table 4, along with the variable name of the group. These
occupational groups will be used to analyze differences in the probability of accepting
a separation incentive program across broad occupational categories.
TABLE 4. ELIGIBLE RATINGS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
Rate Group Ratings Included Variable Name
Administrative AK, AZ, DK, PN, YN,
SK, JO
ADMRATING
Aviation AD, AE, AM, AT, AS AVRATING
Mechanical/Electrical EN, MM, MR, IM, OM,
HT, DC, EM, LI, DM
MECRATING
Support DT, HM, PH, NC, RP,
PC, SH, PR, MA, MS
SUPRATING
Technical DS, ET, IC, DP, RM, CT TECRATING
Combat AW, FC, GM, FT, AO,
WT, TM, MT, EW, ST,
MN
COMRATING
Seamanship AB, BM, QM, SM SMNRATING
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL
The theoretical model used in this thesis is based on several key findings. The
actual leaving behavior and acceptance of a voluntary separation incentive program
were modeled after research conducted on retention behavior. It is assumed that
many of the key factors in the decision to stay in the military are applicable to the
decision to leave. Also, factors were used in model development that were found to
be significant in prior research on civilian downsizing under voluntary incentive
programs. Based on the review of literature and existing research on military
retention, the variables displayed in Table 5 were chosen or created from those
available in the VSI/SSB data set. These variables were considered to be important
factors in the decision to "take" voluntary separation.
Because of missing data in some of the original variables, the final data set that
is used in the empirical analysis contains 31,872 observations, which represents 94
percent of the original data set size. Of these, 3,876 are the service members who
are "takers" of VSI or SSB. There are 76 variables in the final data set. Definitions
and expected signs of the variables that are used for descriptive or statistical analysis
are discussed in the next section.
C. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
Variables that were expected to affect the decision to accept a separation
incentive program were chosen based on the results of studies presented in the
literature review, primarily from research on the effect of the SRB program on
an individual's decision to stay in or leave the military. Explanatory variables were
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TABLE 5. LIST OF VARIABLES USED IN THE MULTIVARIATE
ANALYSIS, VARIABLES FROM THE ORIGINAL VSI/SSB
USED TO CONSTRUCT THEM, AND THE VALUES OF
THE CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES
VARIABLE DEFINITION CONSTRUCTED FROM VALUES
ACCEPT Accept voluntary separation DODCODE, CORRECT PROGRAM 0- Do not accept
1- Accept vol/sep
CHOICE Choice between VSI or SSB
program
Same as above 0- SSB
1- VSI
LOS Length of service ADSDYR variable 10-17 YOS
CONTRACT Time left on enlistment
contract
EAOSYR variable 0-6 years
LASTPRMO Time since last promotion TIRYR variable 0-14 years






BAC2BAC Back to back deployable
duty
DEPL0Y1/2*
Deploy2 is from PASTTYPE
variable
0- Not back to back
1- Back to back
deployable tours
HARRIED Marital status PRIDEP variable 0- Single/divorced
1- Married
CHILDREN Number of children PRIDEP variable 0-5 or more children
MILSPOUS Mi litary spouse PRIDEP variable 0- Non-military
spouse
1- Mi litary spouse
ETHORGN Ethnic origin RACE and ETHNIC
variables





ASIAN Asian ETHORGN/RACE variable 0- Not Asian
1- Asian
HISPANIC Hispanic ETHORGN variable 0- Not Hispanic
1- Hispanic
ALLOTHER Others ETHORGN/RACE variable 0- Not other ethnic
1- Other ethnic
MALE Gender SEX variable 0- Female
1- Male
AFQT Armed Forces Qua I Test AFQT variable 10-99 percent
HSGRAD High school graduate EDCERT variable 0- Non-grad/college
1- High school
graduate





VARIABLE DEFINITION CONSTRUCTED FROM VALUES
COLLEGE More than 12
years of education




HOR variable 2.4-14.9 percent
classified into six categories: tenure, occupational, activity type, demographic,
education and economic.
1. Dependent Variables
The dependent variables were constructed from the DODCODE variable,
or separation code, in the original file. There were 17 codes included in the original
data file, fifteen of which were incorrectly utilized. The variable should have
included only the KCA separation code, indicating those service members who had
been authorized separation under the VSI incentive program, or the KCB separation
code, indicating those service members who had been authorized separation under
the SSB incentive program. Of the 4,119 total service members who were authorized
for separation under VSI/SSB, 256 service members were miscoded.
By cross-matching social security numbers of the miscoded individuals with
the VSI/SSB Encore Approved List it was possible to correctly code all 4,119 takers
under either the KCA or KCB separation code. The PROGRAM variable was used
to construct the two dichotomous dependent variables described below.
a. ACCEPT (accept a voluntary separation incentive program) is a
dichotomous variable representing the actual behavior to either voluntarily leave
military service under the VSI or SSB program, or not to separate. ACCEPT = 1
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if the individual accepted and was approved for separation, and = if he/she was
eligible but did not accept or was not approved for separation.
In the original data set the number of service members who
accepted and were approved for separation equaled 4,119, which is 12.1 percent of
those eligible. The final number of takers in the data set after constructing all
independent variables is 3,876, which is 12.2 percent of 31,872, the new total eligible.
b. CHOICE (The choice between separation programs). The second
part of analysis deals with the decision between the VSI and SSB programs, the
choice between installment versus lump sum payment plans. CHOICE = 1 if the
service member accepted and was approved for the SSB program, and = if he/she
accepted and was approved for VSI. The original percentage split on the programs
of 84.7/15.3 SSB/VSI, was almost identical to the 84.8/15.2 SSB/VSI split in the
final "taker" total of 3,876. Thus, even though missing data reduced the number of
observations of eligibles by 6 percent, the final data appears to be an accurate
representation of the eligible population as well as of those who took voluntary
separation and of those who took VSI versus SSB.
2. Independent Variables
a. Tenure variables
(1) LOS (Length of Service). Length of service is a continuous
measure of the member's total time on active duty. It was computed by subtracting
the ADSDYR (active duty service date year) variable from 1992, since this data set
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has been restricted to VSI/SSB offers during FY 1992, and program offers began in
January 1992.
LOS = (92 - ADSDYR)
LOS eligibility was defined by program specification for each
of the four program offerings in 1992 as being between 10 and 17 years of service.
Some observations in the original data set fell outside this eligibility window by one
year either way, nine and 18 YOS, and those observations were incorporated into the
10 and 17 YOS groups, respectively. The assumption is that the service members
with the nine or 18 YOS were close enough to either the 10 or 17 YOS point at the
time of the program offering as to be considered eligible, i.e., within 10 to 17 YOS
by the time the final submission date for requests occurred.
The expected sign of the LOS variable is negative; as the
length of service increases, the tendency to separate decreases. Assuming that as
individuals invest more time in an organization and accumulate more experience and
information about their job, they come to a decision on whether or not they have
made a "good match" with the job. As a result of this job-matching process, workers
with longer tenure show that they have made the decision that a good match was
made and tend to have lower quit rates. [Ref. 20:p. 373] Also, for those with longer
tenure, at some point the expected financial incentive associated with a 20-year
retirement offsets the value of the separation bonus.
(2) CONTRACT (Years left on current contract). The
CONTRACT variable is a continuous variable indicating the number of years left on
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the service members current contract. It was constructed by subtracting 1992 from
the end of active obligated service year (EAOSYR) variable.
CONTRACT = EAOSYR - 92
The EAOSYR variable used to construct the CONTRACT
variable listed 30 observations with EAOSYR dates prior to 1992. It is assumed that
these service members were on some type of contract extension, or their EAOS was
incorrectly entered. These observations were moved into the EAOS 1992 group, so
that the years left on their current contract would equal zero, and they would be
included with the EAOSYR 1992 group.
The expected sign of the CONTRACT variable is uncertain.
Either an individual could view having more time left on his/her contract as an
opportunity to "hold-out" for a better separation offer, or as a risk of possible RIF
if Navy manpower reductions increase in the future. The threat of RIF was minimal
in the Navy during FY92; however, perceptions of future job security are uncertain
due to the outside influences of changing political and economic considerations.
Also, the longer the time left on the current enlistment contract, the closer the
individual is to the reenlistment decision that brought him on this current contract.
If the service member has more recently reenlisted, the tendency to want to remain
in the service may be greater.
(3) LASTPRMO (Time since last promotion). The time in rate
(TIRYR) variable was used to construct a continuous variable that measures the time
since the last promotion.
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LASTPRMO = (92 - TIRYR)
LASTPRMO is expected to have a positive sign, assuming that the longer it has been
since one's last promotion, the more likely a service member will separate from the
military. This assumes that the longer the time since the last promotion, the lower
one's performance in the Navy, which may serve as an indicator of the service
members view of their opportunities for further advancement within the military.
(4) PAYGRADE (paygrade). A dummy variable for paygrade
of service member, = 1 for paygrade E6, and = otherwise. In this data set only
E6 and E5 pay grades are present. The effect of PAYGRADE is expected to be
negative; as one increases in paygrade he/she is less likely to voluntarily separate.
Human capital theory suggests that as an individual experiences wage increases, i.e.,
promotions, they are less likely to quit their current job because quitting becomes
more costly.
b. Occupational Variables
The 56 eligible Navy enlisted ratings were categorized into seven
homogeneous occupational groups. Seven dummy variables were created, one for
each occupational group, to estimate the differences in the decision to choose to
voluntarily separate across occupations.
The RATEGRUP variables were constructed using three sources to
define specific occupational groupings. The first was research by Bepko, using
econometric models on Navy petty officer retention [Ref. 21]. Bepko used the Navy
enlisted occupational fields method of grouping ratings because he found, of the
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methods he researched, it resulted in the most homogeneous groups. The
occupational fields are descriptive of the work that the service member actually does,
making them useful classifications. There are 24 occupational fields listed, however,
this is too cumbersome a number for use in this analysis. To reduce the number of
groups, research by Eitelberg was used [Ref. 22]. In his research he grouped military
occupations based on the Department of Defense classification system, which groups
ratings into 10 areas.
A third source was used in the final occupational grouping of the
enlisted ratings. The question of marketability of the skill (rating) was assumed to
be important for this analysis and was included in the definition of groupings. The
Occupational Outlook Handbook was used to define enlisted ratings in terms of
civilian occupations. This handbook, along with a cross-walk file which crosses
military ratings/occupations with civilian occupation census data, was used to
determine the marketability of the rating. Descriptions of the final occupational
groupings follow.
The signs of the RATEGRUP dummy variables are expected to vary
between the groups depending upon marketability of skills, promotion opportunities
and deployability of the ratings within the groups, AFQT eligibility requirements and
percentage of non-high school graduates within the groups.
(1) AVRATING (aviation ratings). A dummy variable defining
mechanical, structural and electrical maintenance persons in the aviation field.
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AVRATING = 1 if the rating is AD, AE, AM, AT, or AS, and = otherwise. The
effect of AVRATING is expected to be positive.
(2) MECRATNG (mechanical/electrical ratings). A dummy
variable defining mechanical and electrical maintenance persons. MECRATNG =
1 if the rating is EN, MM, MR, IM, OM, EM, HT, DC, LI, DM, and = otherwise.
The effect of MECRATNG is expected to be positive.
(3) ADMRATNG (administration ratings). A dummy variable
defining administrative support ratings. ADMRATNG = 1 if the rating is AK, AZ,
DK, PN, YN, SK, JO, and = otherwise. The effect of ADMRATNG is expected
to be positive.
(4) TECRATNG (technical ratings). A dummy variable defining
technical electronic, computer, or communications ratings. TECRATNG = 1 if the
rating is DS, ET, IC, DP, RM, CT, and = otherwise. The effect of TECRATNG
is expected to be positive.
(5) SUPRATNG (support ratings). A dummy variable defining
medical, dental, service and support ratings. SUPRATNG = 1 if the rating is DT,
HM, PH, PC, SH, PR, MA, MS, NC, RP, and = otherwise. The effect of
SUPRATNG is expected to be negative.
(6) SMNRATNG (seamanship ratings). A dummy variable
defining seamanship ratings specific to underway operations. SMNRATNG = 1 if
the rating is AB, BM, QM, SM, and = otherwise. The effect of SMNRATNG is
expected to be negative.
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(7) COMRATNG (combat ratings). A dummy variable defining
ratings considered military-specific because of their requirement for the
combat/warfare missions of the Navy. COMRATNG = 1 if the rating is AW, FC,
GM, FT, AO, MN, ST, WT, TM, MT, EW and, = otherwise. COMRATNG will
be used as the omitted condition for all the rating dummy variables. This is expected
to be the least marketable rating group in the civilian sector because of the
organization-specific skills required by these ratings.
c. Activity Variables
(1) DEPLOY (Deployable or non-deployable current activity).
This variable is used as a proxy for family separation, which has been found to be a
factor in military retention/separation decisions. The ONBDTYPE variable was
used to construct the DEPLOY variable. DEPLOY = 1 if the activity is deployable,
and = otherwise.
Deployability is defined by the type of activity to which the
service member is assigned. If the activity has the potential of leaving the area of
it's home base (and the service member's family) for an extended period of time in
order to perform it's mission, such as a ship, aviation squadron, or construction
battalion, the activity was coded as deployable. The effect of DEPLOY is expected
to be positive, assuming that family separation increases the probability that a service
member will separate.
(2) BAC2BAC (Back to back deployable duty assignments). The
effects of having been assigned to consecutive deployable units will be analyzed to
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look further into the family separation issue. The ONBDTYPE and PASTTYPE
variables were used to create DEPLOY 1 and DEPLOY2 variables, respectively, in
order to determine if the service member had served on back-to-back deployable
duty. BAC2BAC = 1 if DEPLOY 1 and DEPLOY2 are both equal to one
(deployable activities) and = if either one or both are zero. The effect of
BAC2BAC is expected to be positive, like the DEPLOY variable.
d. Demographic Variables
(1) MARRIED (married). A dummy variable for married or
not married, with the omitted condition being single or divorced. MARRIED = 1
if the member is married, with or without children, and = if they are single or
divorced, with or without children. The primary dependent (PRIDEP) variable was
used to construct the variable for marital status.
The coefficient of MARRIED is expected to be negative,
assuming that if a service member is married he or she will be less likely to separate
from the service. This is based on previous studies which have found that married
individuals tend to have higher reenlistment rates, so they are not expected to
separate as often as single or divorced service members. [Ref. 15:p. 45]
(2) MILSPOUS (military spouse). A dummy variable with
MILSPOUS = 1 if the member is married to a military spouse, with children or not,
and = if the military member is married to a civilian, single or divorced. The
effect of MILSPOUS is expected to be positive, indicating that a married service
member with a military spouse will be more likely to accept voluntary separation.
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The reason is based on the difficulties encountered in managing dual military careers.
It is assumed that if one member is offered the opportunity to separate under an
incentive bonus program he or she will accept the bonus and separate.
(3) CHILDREN (number of dependent children). CHILDREN
is a continuous variable for the number of children, from one to five or more. The
variable was constructed from the PRIDEP variable and includes both single parents
and married parents. Previous research on retention found that as service members
gain more family responsibility they are more likely to stay in the service, other
things equal. [Ref. 15 :p. 45] Thus, the coefficient of CHILDREN is expected to
have a negative sign, indicating that the more children a service member has, the less
likely he or she is to separate.
(4) ETHORGN (ethnic/origin). Past studies have found that
minorities tended to reenlist at higher rates than whites [Ref. 15 :p. 45]. The original
data set contained a variable for RACE and one for ETHNIC. Six categories of
RACE were listed, including unknown and other, and 22 ETHNIC categories were
listed including none, unknown and other. A frequency distribution of RACE
showed 70.7 percent Caucasian and of ETHNIC showed 80.3 percent claimed "none"
as their ethnic origin.
The ETHORGN variable is a character variable that
combines the RACE and ETHNIC variables into five categories, African American,
Asian, Hispanic, other, and none. It was used in the development of the following
racial/ethnic origin dummy variables that will be used in regression analysis.
45
(5) AFAMER (ethnic origin/African American) is a dummy
variable defining ethnic/racial origin of African Americans. AFAMER = 1 if the
service member has claimed African racial or ethnic origin, and = otherwise.
(6) ASIAN (ethnic origin/Asian) is a dummy variable defining
ethnic/racial origin of Asian Americans. ASIAN = 1 if the service member has
claimed Asian racial or ethnic origin and, = otherwise.
(7) HISPANIC (ethnic origin/Hispanic) is a dummy variable
defining ethnic/racial origin of Hispanic Americans. HISPANIC = 1 if the service
member has claimed Hispanic racial or ethnic origin, and = otherwise.
(8) ALLOTHER (ethnic origin/other) is a dummy variable
defining Americans of Indian, Alaskan, and other ethnic backgrounds. ALLOTHER
= 1 if the service member has claimed Indian, other or unknown racial or ethnic
origin, and = otherwise.
(9) MALE (gender) = 1 for male, and = for female. Past
research suggests that women are more likely to leave the military than men [Ref.
15:p. 63]. Married women also tend to have interrupted careers because of the
increased value of home productivity once young children are added to the family.
[Ref. 15:p. 235] Thus, it is reasonable, based on economic theory, to expect women
to leave the military at higher rates than men. The expected sign of the MALE
variable should therefore be negative.
46
e. Education Variable
(1) AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) is a continuous
variable of percentage scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
Those with higher aptitudes should have greater opportunities in the civilian labor
market, and thus a higher tendency to leave the military. The expected sign of this
variable is positive.
The following variables were included to test the theory that
individuals with more education have better civilian job opportunities, and as a result,
tend to leave the military at a higher rate. [Ref. 15:p. 63]
(2) MENTCAT (Mental category) is a character variable
constructed from the AFQT scores. MENTCAT will be used for descriptive statistics
only, to show if AFQT has any independent impact on the separation decision. The
mental categories which group AFQT scores by percentile scores are listed in Table
6.







Source: [Ref. 15:p. 46]
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(3) NONGRAD (non-graduate of high school) is a dummy
variable defining service members who either have not completed twelve years of
high school, have a certificate of attendance, but not a diploma, or earned a general
education diploma (GED). NONGRAD = 1 if the service member has less than a
high school diploma, and = otherwise.
(4) HSGRAD (high school graduate) is a dummy variable
defining twelve years of education with a high school diploma and those with a
vocational certification. The assumption is that a high school diploma is required for
vocational education. HSGRAD = 1 if the service member has a high school
diploma, and = otherwise.
(5) COLLEGE (more than twelve years of education) is a
dummy variable defining one year of college, or any post high school education up
to and including associates, bachelors, masters and doctorate degrees. COLLEGE
= 1 if the service member has education beyond a high school diploma, and =
otherwise. The COLLEGE variable will be the omitted condition in the analysis of
educational effects.
f. Economic Variables
(1) UNRATE (unemployment rate of home of record) is a
continuous variable constructed by assigning the unemployment rate for each state
to each home of record listed in the HOR variable in the VSI/SSB file. The
assumption was made that the probability of service members returning to their
home of record upon release from active military service is high. Therefore, the
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unemployment rate of the home of record would be a consideration in the decision
to separate voluntarily or not. Unemployment figures were taken from the October
1992 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS publication by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, pp. 157-161.
The specification of the ACCEPT logit model is displayed
below. The preliminary hypotheses about the effects of each variable are indicated
by the expected sign of each variable.
ACCEPT - f(AFAMER AFQT ALLOTHER ASIAN CHILDREN PAYGRADE
_/+ +
CONTRACT GENDER HISPANIC MARRIED MILSPOUS
+ + - +
UNRATE NONGRAD LASTPRMO HSGRAD LOS ADMRATNG
+ +/- +
AVRATING MECRATNG SMNRATNG SUPRATNG TECRATNG)
The specification of the CHOICE logit model is displayed
below. The preliminary hypotheses about the effects of each variable are indicated
by the expected sign of each variable.
ACCEPT = f(AFAMER AFQT ALLOTHER ASIAN CHILDREN PAYGRADE
MALE HISPANIC MARRIED MILSPOUS NONGRAD LOS
+ + +/-




A variable that is expected to be an important factor in the
choice decision that cannot be analyzed at this time deals with the effect of
non-pecuniary benefits packages that are an important part of the total incentive
package. (See Appendix) The FY92 offerings showed great disparity between what
was included in each of the program's benefits packages. The VSI benefits package
contained only pre-separation counseling, employment assistance and relocation
assistance for service members stationed overseas. The SSB package was a much
more complete transition package including transition health care, commissary and
exchange privileges, and priority Reserve and National Guard affiliation. Since all
four offerings in FY92 were made with the same benefit packages, analysis of the
impact the differences in them had on the choice decision cannot be made. Also,
since no separation questionnaire data is available, how the benefits packages
weighed in the individual's decision process between the two programs cannot be
assessed.
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IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This chapter presents a description of and the results from analysis of the
variables described in Chapter III. It will also interpret the results in an attempt to
answer the major research questions of this thesis.
A multivariate data analysis will be performed to study the effects of factors
that influence the decision Navy enlisted personnel make to stay or voluntarily
separate under an incentive program, and which program they choose. Multivariate
logit regression models will be estimated to obtain the direction and magnitude of
the effect of each variable on the decision to accept/reject a voluntary separation
incentive when it is offered. These models estimate the effect of the separation
bonus program, holding other factors constant. The categories of specific explanatory
variables include demographic attributes, experience and background factors, and the
eligibility requirements for the separation incentive programs.
The analysis will include specification and estimation of a multivariate (LOGIT)
model to predict future "take rates" by groups of ratings or enlisted communities.
The models will also estimate the probability that one program is chosen over the
other. The specific area of concentration of the analysis will be the effectiveness of
the programs as force shaping tools.
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Several statistical techniques will be used for preliminary analysis of the data
from the four competed rounds, including t-tests of means and cross-tabulations.
These preliminary analyses will provide information on the independent variables
important to the "takers" of the programs. These variables and other socioeconomic
variables will also be used to construct the multivariate (LOGIT) model to explain
choice behavior. Multivariate data analysis was used to quantify the relationships
between the set of explanatory variables and the binary dependent variables,
ACCEPT and CHOICE.
The logit model was chosen over alternatives such as the linear probability
model or the probit model because; (1) the logit model restricts the probabilities
between zero and one while the logit itself remains unbounded, (2) although the logit
is linear in X, the probabilities are not; this allows for the change in probabilities to
taper off as the values of the explanatory variables increase or decrease indefinitely,
and not increase or decrease linearly with X. [Ref. 23]






= the probability of (1) accepting voluntary separation,
or (2) choosing the VSI program to separate under.
Xj = a row vector of individual and Navy-specific characteristics.
Bj = a column vector of parameters to be estimated. [Ref. 23]
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It can be shown that if Pi is the probability of accepting voluntary
separation/choosing the VSI program, and 1-P
t
is the probability of not choosing
voluntary separation/choosing the SSB program, then
L, = ln[P,/(l-P,)] = 8^,
where L
i?
or the log of the odds ratio, is called the logit. [Ref. 23] Maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to estimate model coefficients. The software
package used was SAS, Release 6.07.
Logit modeling is a procedure that has come to be accepted in most social
science disciplines as the correct methodology when one wishes to perform
regression-type analysis with dichotomous dependent variables. In contrast to
ordinary least squares regression which fits the data to a line, logit analysis models
the data as an s-shaped curve. Specifically, it uses a linear combination of the
independent variable s to calculate a value L for each observation. Then it plots P
as a function of L according to the following equation;
ln(P/{l-P}) = L,
where P = (the probability that the dependent variable is 1), and L = a+bX, a
linear combination of the independent variables. [Ref. 24]
Logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret because of the way the
b's are reported; ln(p/{l-P}) = a+bX. Logistic regression coefficients tell you that
a one-unit change in an independent variable will result in a b-unit change in the
natural logarithm of the ratio of the probability that the dependent variable is one
to one minus the probability that the dependent variable is one. In order to more
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efficiently interpret the coefficients, the left-hand side of the equation is simply
referred to as "log odds." Thus the interpretation becomes a one-unit change in an
independent variable results in a b-unit change in the log odds of the dependent
variable. Because of the difficulty with understanding and interpreting natural
logarithms, another statistic, the marginal probability, is calculated to interpret the
estimated coefficients from the logistic regressions. [Ref. 24]
Marginal probability is a statistic that reflects what effect a one unit change in
an independent variable will have directly on the probability that the dependent
variable is one. The key to understanding logistic regression, then, is to solve
for P, since P is simply interpreted as the estimated probability that the dependent
variable is one. Solving for P yields the following equation [Ref. 24];
P = l/[l + exp(-{a+bX})].
To compute the marginal probability associated with an independent variable,
first compute P for each observation. Then, change the value of a given independent
variable by one unit and recompute P with the new value. The marginal probability
with respect to the chosen independent variable is then simply the difference between
the two P's. This marginal probability is computed for each case, and the mean of
this statistic across all cases is then reported. [Ref. 24]
Logit models were estimated for all ratings combined and then separately for
each of the seven rating groups. This allowed an assessment of differences in the
effects of each explanatory variable across occupational groupings.
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B. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS
This section describes the data for four populations from the original data set:
(a) personnel offered a voluntary separation incentive, N = 31,872; (b) personnel
who accepted voluntary separation, n = 3,876; (c) personnel who did not accept, n
= 27,996; and (d) personnel who chose the VSI program n = 589. The means, which
indicate the distribution of characteristics across the sample, of the explanatory
variables used later in the multivariate model are presented for these four
populations in Table 7. They indicate that personnel with higher AFQT scores are
the ones making the decision to separate and are choosing the VSI program.
Married members are represented in near equal proportions in all four populations.
Enlisted males are 89.6 percent of the eligible population, which means that
enlisted females make up 10.4 percent. This is slightly higher than the overall Navy
percentage of 9.7 percent enlisted females. [Ref. 25 :p. P14] There is a higher
percentage of males among those eligible not separating than among those
separating.
There is a smaller proportion of minorities among those eligible separating than
among those not separating. The percentages of African Americans, Asians and
other ethnic groups are higher in the eligible population than in the Navy as a whole.
In the Navy 17.7 percent of service members are African American; of the eligible
population they are 21.6 percent. One percent of the overall Navy population falls
in the ethnic group that includes American Indians and Alaskan Natives; in the
eligible population, however, they are 6.5 percent. Asians are 4.6 percent of the
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TABLE 7
MEANS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES BY GROUP
ELIGIBLE SEPARATED NOT SEPARATED ACCEPTED VSI
N 31872 3876 27996 589
VARIABLE
AFQT 58.473 60.646 58.173 63333
AFAMER (%) 0.216 0.138 0.227 0.087
ASIAN (%) 0.049 0.021 0.053 0.020
ALLOTHER (%) 0.065 0.061 0.066 0.085
HISPANIC (%) 0.042 0.036 0.042 0.032
MARRIED (%) 0.792 0.765 0.796 0.725
MILSPOUS (%) 0.054 0.070 0.052 0.095
CHILDREN (#) 1.492 1.494 1.492 1.378
MALE (%) 0.896 0.861 0.901 0.832
CONTRACT (years) 2.228 1.776 2.290 1.691
PAYGRADE (%) 0.702 0.588 0.718 0.654
LASTPRMO (years) 4.569 4.691 4352 5.090
LOS (years) 12.875 12.669 12.903 13.654
UNRATE (%) 7.357 7.179 7.382 7.154
NONGRAD (%) 0.141 0.187 0.134 0.165
HSGRAD (%) 0.820 0.781 0.825 0.790
ADMRATNG (%) 0.160 0.171 0.158 0.166
AVRATING (%) 0.148 0.152 0.147 0.178
MECRATNG (%) 0.161 0.144 0.163 0.132
SMNRATNG (%) 0.081 0.085 0.081 0.048
SUPRATNG (%) 0.152 0.125 0.155 0.151
TECRATNG (%) 0.175 0.172 0.175 0.177
ACCEPT (%) 0.122 1.000 — 1.000
CHOICE (%) - 0.152 - 1.000
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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overall Navy, and 4.9 percent of the eligible population. Hispanics are 6.5 percent
of the overall Navy, and 4.2 percent of the eligible population. [Ref. 25:p. P12]
Cross-tabulations were run on the ACCEPT and CHOICE models between the
RATEGRUP dummy variables and the LOS variable. Results are shown in Table
8. This table shows the percentage distribution of service members by occupational
grouping and length of service for each of three separate populations; those offered,
those who accepted either program, and those who chose VSI over SSB.
Table 8 displays the results of the bivariate analysis by RATEGRUP and LOS
for each of three of the populations. The five highest and five lowest take rates from
Table 8 are shown below. Also shown is the percentage of each of the top and
bottom rating groups that was offered separation:
RATING GROUP LOS PERCENT TAKERS PERCENT OFFERED
Top Five
Technical 10-11 44.2 35.3
Combat 10-11 42.0 33.1
Seamanship 10-11 36.0 37.8
Mechanical 10-11 35.0 33.9
Aviation 10-11 34.3 25.5
Bottom Five
Mechanical 16-17 11.1 10.4
Technical 16-17 10.6 11.0
Aviation 16-17 10.4 12.0
Administration 16-17 9.4 12.9
Combat 16-17 9.1 10.6
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TABLE 8
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP BY LENGTH OF SERVICE (LOS)
a. Percent Distribution Eligible
LOS
RATEGRUP 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 TOTAL
ADMIN 28.4 32.1 26.6 12.9 100
AVIATION 25-5 33.2 29.3 12.0 100
COMBAT 33.1 31.8 24.5 10.6 100
MECHANICAL 33.9 32.7 23.1 10.4 100
SEAMANSHIP 37.8 28.6 23.4 10.3 100
SUPPORT 21.0 32.1 31.0 15.9 100
TECHNICAL 35.3 30.9 22.8 11.0 100
b. Percent Distribution Takers
LOS
RATEGRUP 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 TOTAL
ADMIN 33.1 30.2 27.3 9.4 100
AVIATION 34.3 31.1 24.3 10.4 100
COMBAT 42.0 28.8 20.2 9.1 100
MECHANICAL 35.0 30.0 24.0 11.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 36.0 27.9 24.9 11.2 100
SUPPORT 23.9 29.2 31.9 15.0 100
TECHNICAL 44.2 27.4 17.7 10.6 100
c Percent Distribution VSI Takers
LOS
RATEGRUP 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 TOTAL
ADMIN 17.4 28.6 38.8 15.3 100
AVIATION 12.4 30.5 36.2 21.0 100
COMBAT 23.0 20.7 36.8 19.5 100
MECHANICAL 18.0 26.9 32.1 23.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 17.9 28.6 25.0 28.6 100
SUPPORT 12.4 20.2 48.3 19.1 100
TECHNICAL 21.2 25.0 31.7 22.1 100
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel.
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The top take rate (44.2 percent) is in the technical group, LOS 10-11 years, followed
by combat, LOS 10-11 (42.0 percent), and seamanship, LOS 10-11 (36.0 percent).
The mechanical and aviation groups follow with the next high take rates of 35.0 and
34.3 percent respectively, both in the LOS 10-11 cells. The support rating group does
not follow expectations or the findings of regression analysis in that the highest
percentage take rate, 31.9, is in the LOS 14-15 year cell, not a lower length of service
cell.
Overall, the highest VSI take rate falls in the LOS 14-15 cell for all but one
rating group, seamanship, which supports the hypothesis that older (which is
correlated with length of service), less present-oriented individuals are more likely
to accept installment payments. However, the VSI take rate in the LOS 16-17 cell
drops off dramatically, indicating that VSI is not viewed as adequate compensation
when compared to the value of retirement.
This lower take rate for VSI in the highest LOS cell also may be correlated
with the different non-pecuniary benefits packages that were being offered with the
two programs in the FY92 rounds. (See Appendix) The SSB benefits package
contained non-pecuniary benefits that were closer in type and number to those that
are offered at retirement, and may have been perceived as worth more than the
additional monetary compensation paid by the VSI program.
Cross-tabulations were also run for take rate by occupational groupings and by
education. The results are shown in Table 9. The highest proportion of high school
graduates by rating group is in the technical ratings (86.3 percent), which is not
surprising considering the high eligibility requirements for entrance into technical
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rates. The highest proportion of non-high school graduates is in the seamanship
ratings, 23.8 percent. Percentages of high school graduates in the "taker" population
for all rating groups are less than in the overall eligible population, indicating that
the Navy is not losing a disproportionate share of high school graduates. The
percentages of non-high school graduates in the "taker" population for all rating
groups exceed the percentages in the overall eligible population, indicating that the
Navy is disproportionately separating non-high school graduates.
Cross-tabulations were also run for take rate by occupational groupings and by
deployability. The results are shown in Table 10. The highest proportion of
deployable assignments by rating group in the eligible population is in the aviation
ratings (56.9 percent), followed by seamanship and mechanical, with 55.8 and 55.7
percent, respectively. The highest proportion of service members who have been
assigned to back-to-back deployable assignments is the same as for deployable
assignments; aviation, 14.3 percent, seamanship, 12.8 percent and mechanical, 12.2
percent.
The highest take rate for deployable assignments is for seamanship, 54.9
percent, which includes the most sea-intensive ratings. The next two highest take
rates were also in the top three rating groups in the eligible population, mechanical;
52.0 percent, and aviation, 51.3 percent. The highest acceptance percentage among
back-to-back deployable assignments is the aviation ratings, 13.1 percent. This is
to be expected because aviation represents the category with the largest percentage
of those offered. The lowest percentage of deployable assignments is in the
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TABLE 9
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP BY EDUCATION
a. Percent Distribution Eligible
EDUCATION
RATEGRUP HSGRAD NONGRAD COLLEGE TOTAL
ADMIN 80.4 12.4 7.2 100
AVIATION 81.7 15.3 3.0 100
COMBAT 80.1 16.7 3.2 100
MECHANICAL 84.2 12.2 3.6 100
SEAMANSHIP 75.2 23.8 1.0 100
SUPPORT 81.6 14.4 4.0 100
TECHNICAL 86.3 9.6 4.1 100
b. Percent Distribution Takers
EDUCATION
RATEGRUP HSGRAD NONGRAD COLLEGE TOTAL
ADMIN 77.6 163 5.9 100
AVIATION 76.9 20.0 2.2 100
COMBAT 76.7 21.4 1.9 100
MECHANICAL 79.2 183 2.3 100
SEAMANSHIP 70.6 28.2 1.2 100
SUPPORT 77.2 20.4 2.4 100
TECHNICAL 84.6 10.8 4.6 100
c Percent Distribution VSI Takers
EDUCATION
RATEGRUP HSGRAD NONGRAD COLLEGE TOTAL
ADMIN 80.6 122 7.2 100
AVIATION 79.1 19.1 1.8 100
COMBAT 79.3 18.4 2.3 100
MECHANICAL 793 18.0 23 100
SEAMANSHIP 64.3 32.1 3.6 100
SUPPORT 773 16.9 5.6 100
TECHNICAL 81.7 10.6 7.7 100
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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TABLE 10
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP BY DEPLOYABILITY
a. Percent Distribution Eligible
DEPLOYABILITY
RATEGRUP DEPLOY1 BAC2BAC OTHER TOTAL
ADMIN 40.2 8.0 51.8 100
AVIATION 56.9 14.3 28.8 100
COMBAT 49.9 9.0 41.1 100
MECHANICAL 55.7 12.2 32.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 55.8 12.8 31.4 100
SUPPORT 40.6 8.6 50.8 100
TECHNICAL 40.9 6.5 52.6 100
b. Percent Distribution Takers
DEPLOYABILITY
RATEGRUP DEPLOY1 BAC2BAC OTHER TOTAL
ADMIN 35.8 7.1 57.1 100
AVIATION 51.3 13.1 35.6 100
COMBAT 41.8 65 51.7 100
MECHANICAL 52.0 9.7 38.3 100
SEAMANSHIP 54.9 9.4 35.7 100
SUPPORT 43.8 8.4 47.8 100
TECHNICAL 36.3 5.4 58.3 100
c Percent Distribution VSI Takers
DEPLOYABILITY
RATEGRUP DEPLOY1 BAC2BAC OTHER TOTAL
ADMIN 30.0 6.1 63.9 100
AVIATION 52.4 13.3 34.3 100
COMBAT 48.3 8.1 43.6 100
MECHANICAL 38.5 7.7 53.8 100
SEAMANSHIP 57.1 7.1 35.8 100
SUPPORT 33.7 5.6 60.7 100
TECHNICAL 40.4 3.9 55.7 100
Source: Derived from data obtained irom Bureau ot Personnel
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administrative ratings, 40.2 percent, which likewise has the lowest "take" rate, 35.8
percent.
In general, the "take" rate percentages are lower than the percentages of the
population offered, except in the support ratings, where 40.6 percent were offered
and 43.8 percent voluntarily separated. This indicates that generally the deployability
and thus family separation issues are not important factors in the decision to
separate.
Cross-tabulations were also run for take rate by occupational groupings and by
gender. The results are shown in Table 11. Consistent with the overall eligible
population, the highest proportion of takers are males in every rating group.
However, females consistently show a higher percentage "take-rate" compared to
their percentage of the overall population than males, while male "take-rate"
percentages are lower in all cases than their overall percentages.
The percentage of eligible females within the rating groups reflect their rating
groups participation in the Navy as a whole, where women's jobs fall most often in
the health care, administrative and technical skill areas [Ref. 25:p. P14]. The
greatest female participation by rating group is in the administrative ratings at 25.3
percent, followed by the technical ratings at 16.1 percent, and support rating group
at 14.0 percent.
Cross-tabulations were also run for take rate by occupational groupings and by
mental categories. The results are shown in Table 12. The table shows that in the
eligible rating groups, personnel are found mostly in mental categories II, IIIA and
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IIIB. The percentage take rates indicate that the Navy is not disproportionately
separating personnel in mental category IIIA or IIIB. There is however a
disproportionate percentage of personnel in mental category I separating, and even
more so in mental category II. Mental category IV personnel tend to remain in the
service.
C. MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF ACCEPT DECISION
The purpose of this multivariate model is to identify the factors affecting the
decision of eligible enlisted members to accept a monetary incentive program and
voluntarily separate or to stay. The multivariate model examines the marginal effect
of each explanatory variable, holding constant all of the other factors. The ACCEPT
model contains 31,872 observations, representing service members who were eligible
for the four FY92 offerings (2,160 observations were lost due to missing variables in
the original VSI/SSB data set). The dependent variable represents a binary choice,
to accept or not. This choice was modeled as a function of tenure, occupation,
assignment background, demographic, educational and economic variables. Table
13 lists the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients of each variable and the LOGIT
coefficient along with the Wald Chi-square and significance level. The effects of the
explanatory variables on the probability of voluntarily separating are discussed
below. The AFQT variable is significant at the 99% level. However, the logit
coefficient is very small, indicating that the effect of a one-unit increase in AFQT
on the separation decision is nil, less than 1 percent. However, if AFQT were to
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TABLE 11
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP BY GENDER
a. Percent Distribution Eligible
GENDER
RATEGRUP MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ADMIN 74.7 25.3 100
AVIATION 95.0 5.0 100
COMBAT 99.0 1.0 100
MECHANICAL 97.9 2.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 96.9 3.1 100
SUPPORT 86.0 14.0 100
TECHNICAL 83.9 16.1 100
b. Percent Distribution Takers
GENDER
RATEGRUP MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ADMIN 65.7 34.3 100
AVIATION 91.9 8.1 100
COMBAT 98.8 1.2 100
MECHANICAL 95.9 4.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 95.5 4.5 100
SUPPORT 82.1 17.9 100
TECHNICAL 80.5 19.5 100
c Percent Distribution VSI Takers
GENDER
RATEGRUP MALE FEMALE TOTAL
ADMIN 59.2 40.8 100
AVIATION 93.3 6.7 100
COMBAT 98.9 1.1 100
MECHANICAL 94.9 5.1 100
SEAMANSHIP 96.4 3.6 100
SUPPORT 773 225 100
TECHNICAL 75.0 25.0 100
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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increase by one category (say, from category IIIB to IIIA) or by 10 percentage points,
the take rate would increase by 1 percentage point. The cross-tabulation of AFQT
by RATEGRUP, discussed earlier presents a much more detailed analysis of the
effect of AFQT on the separation decision.
The minority variables are all statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level. The signs of the coefficients are negative as expected, indicating that
minorities are less likely than Caucasians to voluntarily separate. This supports
previous research which suggests that minorities are more likely to stay in the
military than whites because of perceived lower civilian job opportunities [Ref. 15:p.
63]. The minority variables have some of the largest effects on the probability of
accepting the bonus. For example, both African Americans and Asians are 7 percent
less likely to accept, while Hispanics are 3 percent less likely.
The MARRIED and MILSPOUS variables are both statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. The coefficient of the MARRIED variable is negative as
expected, indicating that married service members are less likely than single sailors
to voluntarily separate. The coefficient of the MILSPOUS variable is positive as
expected, indicating that service members who are married to other military members
are more likely to voluntarily separate.
The CHILDREN variable is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
The sign of the coefficient is positive, which is not as expected, indicating that the
more children you have, the more likely you are to voluntarily separate. This may
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TABLE 12
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP BY MENTCAT
a. Percent Distribution Eligible
MENTCAT
RATEGRUP I II IIIA IIIB IV TOTAL
ADMIN 2.3 27.5 31.6 28.3 10.4 100
AVIATION 5.4 38.8 25.0 24.7 6.1 100
COMBAT 53 44.0 203 23.8 5.2 100
MECHANICAL 9.8 37.3 24.2 193 9.3 100
SEAMANSHIP 1.3 18.2 37.2 23.9 193 100
SUPPORT 1.9 20.8 373 27.2 12.6 100
TECHNICAL 8.5 44.9 19.1 22.1 53 100
b. Percent Distribution Takers
MENTCAT
RATEGRUP I II IIIA IIIB IV TOTAL
ADMIN 2.6 35.7 26.0 29.6 6.2 100
AVIATION 8.0 47.5 15.6 23.4 5.4 100
COMBAT 7.0 45.6 20.9 21.9 4.6 100
MECHANICAL 7.0 36.7 26.3 20.6 9.3 100
SEAMANSHIP 1.2 20.0 32.7 30.3 15.8 100
SUPPORT 2.3 25.1 37.9 25.1 9.7 100
TECHNICAL 8.0 49.0 17.4 21.7 3.9 100
c. Percent Distribution VSI Takers
MENTCAT
RATEGRUP I II IIIA IIIB IV TOTAL
ADMIN 6.1 35.7 253 29.6 3.1 100
AVIATION 93 53.3 14.3 15.2 7.6 100
COMBAT 14.9 42.5 23.0 16.1 33 100
MECHANICAL 7.7 383 21.8 25.6 6.4 100
SEAMANSHIP 21.4 28.6 28.6 21.4 100
SUPPORT 3.4 29.2 42.7 19.1 5.6 100
TECHNICAL 16.4 51.9 15.4 15.4 1.0 100
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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TABLE 13
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS ON ACCEPT/
NOT ACCEPT MODEL
VARIABLE LOS-COEF WAIDX2 Pr>X2 PROB/DX"
INTERCEPT 0.147 — — -
AFQT (c) 0.005 21.818 .0001* 0.001
AFAMER -0.751 194.220 .0001* -0.071
ASIAN -0.913 59.073 .0001* -0.069
ALLOTHER -0.220 8.894 .0029* -0.024
HISPANIC -0.335 12.327 .0004* -0.035
MARRIED -0.163 11.941 .0005* -0.017
MILSPOUS 0.239 9.241 .0024* 0.027
CHILDREN (c) 0.080 26.918 .0001* 0.008
MALE -0.323 28.887 .0001* -0.038
CONTRACT (c) -0.248 391.126 .0001* -0.024
PAYGRDE6 -0.675 258.919 .0001* -0.075
LASTPRMO (c) 0.001 0.004 .9501 -0.000
LOS (c) -0.036 11.114 .0009* -0.003
NONGRAD 0.420 15.157 .0001* 0.045
HSGRAD 0.106 1.120 .2899 0.009
UNRATE (c) -0.059 30.506 .0001* -0.006
TECRATNG -0.196 9.477 .0021* -0.023
MECRATNG -0.175 7.244 .0071* -0.021
ADMRATNG -0.263 15.831 .0001* -0.028
AVRATING -0.396 36.867 .0001* -0.043
SUPRATNG -0.475 46.762 .0001* -0.049
SMNRATNG -0.217 7.867 .0050* -0.023
Model Chi-Square = 1311.859 with 22 DF (p = 0.0001); n=3876
* Significant at the 99% confidence level
NOTE: ' Computed from ordinary least squares
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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support family separation as an indicator of the decision to stay or leave. Also it
counters the family responsibility argument used for the MARRIED variable
because, with more family responsibility, i.e., more children, one would be less likely
to voluntarily separate.
The variable MALE is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign of the
coefficient is negative as expected, indicating that male service members are less
likely to voluntarily separate. The finding that female service members are more
likely to separate may support the economic theory about labor force participation
rates among women. That is, this may be an example of a career interruption that
is commonly observed among civilian labor force participants.
The variable CONTRACT is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign
of the coefficient is negative, indicating that as years left on the current enlistment
contract increase, service members are less likely to accept voluntary separation. The
CONTRACT variable is one of the most significant variables in the model, with a
Wald chi-square of 391.126.
The variable LASTPRMO is statistically insignificant. The sign of the
coefficient of LASTPRMO is negative, which indicates that the longer it has been
since the service member's last promotion, the less likely he/she is to accept
voluntary separation. If promotion history is an indicator of performance, the poorer
performers are opting to stay in the Navy. This relationship also could be an
indication of perception of marketability in the civilian work place.
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The LOS variable is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign of the
coefficient is negative as expected, indicating that the greater the length of service,
the less likely the service members are to accept voluntary separation. This result
supports economic theory that suggests that more time one spends in an organization,
the more organization-specific skills they acquire and the less likely they are to leave.
The variable PAYGRADE is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign
of the coefficient is negative as expected, indicating that those in the higher paygrade
(E6) are less likely to accept voluntary separation. The paygrade variable is one of
the most significant variables in the model, with a Wald chi-square of 258.919.
The HSGRAD, NONGRAD and COLLEGE variables were constructed from
the EDCERT variable in the original data set as dichotomous variables to test the
theory that more education leads to better civilian job opportunities and as a result,
would increase the probability that the service member would voluntarily separate.
COLLEGE was used as the comparison group. The HSGRAD and NONGRAD
variables are highly correlated, .8637, showing a strong linear association.
Although the HSGRAD variable is not statistically significant, the sign of the
coefficient is positive. This supports the theory that more education makes an
individual more marketable and therefore more likely to voluntarily separate. The
NONGRAD variable is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign of the
coefficient of the NONGRAD variable is positive, which goes against expectations.
It was anticipated that military members who are non-high school graduates would
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be less likely to voluntarily separate because of perceived limited opportunities in the
civilian job market.
The UNRATE variable is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign of
the coefficient is negative as expected, indicating that as the unemployment rate
increases in the service member's home of record, he or she is less likely to
voluntarily separate. The assumption was made that, if they separate, service
members would return to their home of record. It is also reasonable to interpret the
UNRATE variable generically, in that as the unemployment rate across the nation
increases, the service member is less likely to voluntarily separate.
The six dummy variables for the occupational groupings are all significant at
the 99% confidence level, and all of their coefficients have negative signs. This
indicates that any rating group other than the combat rating group is less likely to
accept voluntary separation.
The classification table, Table 14, will be used to assess the goodness-of-fit of
the ACCEPT model. The ACCEPT model correctly classified 60.5 percent of all of
the cases. The sensitivity of the model is the proportion of EVENT responses that
were predicted to be EVENT; the specificity of the model is the proportion of NO
EVENT responses that were predicted to be NO EVENT. The false positive and
false negative rates measure the proportion of predicted EVENT/NO EVENT
responses that were observed as NO EVENT/EVENT. [Ref. 26:pp. 1091-92] In
other words, it measures the incorrectness of the prediction. The sensitivity of the
ACCEPT model is 64.4 percent; the specificity, 59.9 percent. False positives were
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81.8 percent; false negatives, 7.6 percent. This indicates that the model predicts
better when an individual chooses not to separate.
Another goodness-of-fit measure used is the log likelihood ratio test. The
likelihood ratio statistic is computed as equal to -2 Log Lq - Lh The computed
Chi-square tests the hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal to
zero. If the Chi-square is large, reject the null hypothesis. The Chi-square for the
ACCEPT model is 1311.859 with 22 DF (p = 0.0001).
D. MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF CHOICE OF SEPARATION PAYMENT
DECISION
The purpose of the CHOICE model is to identify the factors affecting the
choice of the specific incentive program by enlisted members who have chosen to
voluntarily separate. The CHOICE model contains 3,876 observations, representing
service members who applied and were approved for voluntary separation from one
of the four FY92 offerings (243 observations were lost due to missing variables inthe
original VSI/SSB data set). The dependent variable represents a binary choice, VSI
or SSB. It was modeled as a function of basis demographic, educational and
economic, length of service, paygrade and rating variables. Table 15 lists the OLS
coefficients of each variable and the LOGIT coefficient, along with the Wald
Chi-square and significance level. The effects of each explanatory variable on the
probability of selecting VSI are discussed below.
The AFQT variable is not statistically significant, indicating that AFQT has no
effect on the choice between programs. The AFAMER variable is statistically
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significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign of the coefficient is negative as
expected, indicating that African Americans are less likely to choose VSI over SSB
than Caucasians. The AFAMER variable is the second most significant variable in
the model, with a Wald chi-square of 10.259. The other ethnic variables are
statistically insignificant. The signs of the coefficients of the ASIAN and HISPANIC
variables are negative, as is AFAMER; however, the coefficient of the variable
ALLOTHER is positive, indicating "other" ethnic service members are more likely
to choose VSI over SSB.
The MARRIED and MILSPOUS variables are both statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level. The coefficient of the MARRIED variable indicates that
married service members are less likely than single members to choose VSI over
SSB. The coefficient of the MILSPOUS variable indicates that service members who
are married to other military members are more likely to choose the VSI option.
The CHILDREN variable is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The
sign indicates that the more children you have, the less likely you are to choose VSI
over SSB.
The choice of VSI versus SSB could be driven by differences in the benefits
packages associated with the two programs. Married service members and those with
children tend to select the SSB program, which has the most benefits to assist in the
transition to a new job and lifestyle. These include benefits important to service
members with family responsibilities such as two years of exchange and commissary
privileges, both CHAMPUS and in-house health care for up to 120 days after
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TABLE 14
TABLE CLASSIFICATION TABLE LOGIT/ACCEPT MODEL
PREDICTED























False pos. - 81.8
False neg. - 7.6
Corrrect - 60.5
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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separation, and extended use of military housing of up to 180 days. Another benefit
useful to service members with family responsibilities is the priority National Guard
and Reserve affiliation, which could mean additional or interim income after
separation.
That service members with military spouses tend to choose the VSI program
could further support the hypothesis that differences in the benefits package was a
major factor influencing the choice decision. Service members with military spouses
do not have to rely on transition benefits from the military since, as a military
dependent, they will remain eligible for all of the benefits that are being offered
under the SSB program. The VSI program pays the highest monetary separation
bonus. However, the fact that 84.8 percent of the service members who chose to
voluntarily separate chose the SSB program indicates that the non-monetary
transition benefit package was an important factor.
The variable MALE is significant at the 95% confidence level. The sign of the
coefficient indicates that male service members are less likely to choose VSI over
SSB. The LOS variable is statistically significant and indicates that the greater the
length of service, the more likely the service member is to choose VSI.
The variable PAYGRADE is not statistically significant. The NONGRAD
variable is significant at the 90% confidence level. The negative sign of the
coefficient of the NONGRAD variable indicates that non-high school graduates are
less likely to choose VSI over SSB.
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TABLE 15
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS ON CHOICE
BETWEEN VSI/SSB MODEL
Variable Logit Coef Wald X2 Pr>X2 AProb/AX»
INTERCEPT -5.085 — — —
AFQT 0.004 1.961 .1614 0.000
AFAMER -0.536 10259 .0014 -0.055
ASIAN -0.111 0.112 .7375 -0.014
ALLOTHER 0.143 0.675 .4114 0.019
HISPANIC -0.006 0.000 .9814 -0.002
MALE -0337 4.977 .0257** -0.041
MARRIED -0279 5.580 .0182** -0.036
MILSPOUS 0.457 5.650 .0175** 0.061
CHILDREN -0.073 3242 .0718* -0.008
NONGRAD -0225 3208 .0733* -0.027
LOS 0297 153.088 .0001** 0.038
PAYGRADE 0.026 0.062 .8042 0.001
TECRATNG -0.055 0.109 .7418 -0.006
AVRATING 0.083 0253 .6151 0.012
ADMRATNG -0261 2245 .1341 -0.034
SUPRATNG 0.011 0.004 .9511 0.002
SMNRATNG -0.661 7.760 .0053** -0.064
MECRATNG -0.166 0.907 3408 -0.020
Model CHI-SQUARE = 236.494 with 18 DF (p = 0.0001); n = 589
* Significant at the 90% confidence level
** Significant at the 95% confidence level
NOTE: * Computation from Ordinary Least Squares
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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The dummy variables for the six occupational groupings are statistically
insignificant except for SMNRATNG, which is significant at the 95% confidence
level. The TECRATNG, ADMRATNG, SMNRATNG and MECRATNG
coefficients are negative, indicating that service members in these groups are less
likely to choose VSI over SSB. The AVRATING and SUPRATNG coefficients are
positive, indicating that service members in these groups are more likely to choose
VSI over SSB.
The classification table, Table 16, will be used to assess the goodness-of-fit of
the CHOICE model. The model correctly classified 65.7 percent of the cases. The
sensitivity of the CHOICE model is 60.1 percent; the specificity, 66.7 percent. False
positives were 75.6 percent; false negatives, 9.7 percent. This indicates that the
model more correctly predicts when an individual chooses the SSB option. The
Chi-square for the CHOICE model is 236.494 with 18 DF (p = 0.0001).
E. ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITIES FROM LOGIT MODELS USING
"NOTIONAL PERSON" APPROACH
1. Overall probabilities
The base case, i.e., notional person, for the ACCEPT model is a white
male, married to a civilian, with the average number of children (2); his home of
record has the average unemployment rate of 7.3; he is a high school graduate with
an average AFQT score of 60; he is an E6 in the combat ratings group with the
average number of years left on his current enlistment contract (2), average length
of service (13), and the average number of years since his last promotion (5).
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TABLE 16
TABLE CLASSIFICATION TABLE LOGIT/CHOICE MODEL
PREDICTED


























Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
The probability of accepting voluntary separation for this base case person
is 13.5 percent; the actual percentage of "takers" in the population is 12.2 percent.
By changing each independent variable by one unit, the change in the accept
probabilities can be computed. That is, we can change one explanatory variable by
one unit while holding the others fixed at their mean values. The results of this
calculation are presented in Table 17.
The largest differences from the base case are for African American
males, who are 6.7 percent less likely to accept voluntary separation. Also, Asian
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TABLE 17
PREDICTED TAKE RATE AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE FOR






Base Case 13.5 15.0
(MALE) AFAMER 6.8 -6.7 9.4 -5.6
HISPANIC 10.0 -3.5 14.9 -0.1
ASIAN 5.9 -7.6 13.7 -1.3
OTHER 11.1 -2.4 16.9 + 1.9
(FEMALE) CAUC 17.7 + 4.2 19.9 + 4.9
AFAMER 9.2 -4.3 12.7 -2.3
HISPANIC 13.3 -0.2 19.8 + 4.8
ASIAN 7.9 -5.6 18.2 + 3.2
OTHER 14.7 + 1.2 22.2 + 7.2
3 CHILDREN 14.4 + 0.9 12.4 -2.6
SINGLE 15.5 + 2.0 21.8 +6.8
MILSPOUSE 16.5 + 3.0 18.9 + 3.9
PAYGRADE E5 23.4 + 9.9 14.7 -0.3
LOS 12 13.9 + 0.4 11.6 -3.4
LOS 14 13.1 -0.4 19.2 + 4.2
NONGRAD 17.6 +4.1 14.1 -0.9
ADMRATNG 10.7 -2.8 16.1 + 1.1
AVRATING 9.5 -4.0 12.0 -3.0
MECRATNG 11.6 -1.9 13.0 -2.0
SMNRATNG 11.1 -2.4 8.4 -6.6
SUPRATNG 8.8 -4.7 15.2 +0.2
TECRATNG 11.3 -2.2 14.3 -0.7
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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males and females are 7.6 and 5.6 percent, respectively, less likely to accept. The
change having the largest effect is from E6 to E5, with E5 petty officers being 9.9
percent more likely to voluntarily separate than E6s.
Caucasian females are around four percent more likely and African
American females are around four percent less likely than Caucasian males to
separate. Non-high school graduates are four percent more likely to separate than
high school graduates. In the rate groupings all are less likely to separate than the
combat ratings, with support and aviation having the largest percentage differences.
The base case, i.e., notional person, for the CHOICE model is a white
male, married to a civilian, with the average number of children (2); he is a high
school graduate with an average AFQT score (60), and an E6 in the combat ratings
comparison group.
The largest differences from the base case in the CHOICE model are for
females in the "other" ethnic category, who are 7.2 percent more likely to take VSI
over the base case. African American males are 5.6 percent less likely to choose VSI
than white males. Single service members are 6.8 percent more likely to take VSI
than married members. The only rating group that showed a significant difference
from the base case is the seamanship group, which was 6.6 percent less likely to
choose VSI.
Caucasian and Hispanic females are four percent more likely than
Caucasian males to choose VSI. Service members with higher lengths of service are
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more likely to choose VSI, and married service members who are married to other
military members are also more likely to choose VSI.
2. Probabilities by paygrade, LOS and rating group
The following analysis is based on the notional person definitions listed
above for both of the models. In this analysis of differences between rating groups,
the paygrade was held constant for both paygrades while changing the length of
service from 10 to 17 years, the window of eligibility outlined by OPNAV (see
Appendix). As before, the base case length of service is 13 years.
Table 18 presents the predicted "take" rates for paygrade E5 by rating
group and LOS. The administrative rating group has the highest percentage take
rate for the base case LOS. It is 10.2 percentage points above the actual take rate.
The most significant difference in predicted take rate is the combat rating group
with 10 years LOS, (27.6 percent, 15.4 percent above the actual take rate). The next
most significant is the technical rating group with 10 years LOS.
Table 19 presents the predicted "take" rates for paygrade E6 by rating
group and LOS. The combat rating group has the highest percentage take rate for
the base case LOS (13.7 percent). The base case percentage take rates that are
above the actual take rates are for the combat and technical rating groups only; all
other rating group take rates fall below.
Table 20 presents the predicted VSI program "take" rates for paygrade E5
by rating group and LOS. The support rating group has the highest percentage VSI
take rate for the base case LOS (16.8 percent). The percentage take rates are all
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below the actual take rates except for the support and combat rating groups.
Overall, the VSI take rate percentages for E5s are below the actual take rate, until
you reach fifteen years of service, for this base case.
Table 21 presents the predicted VSI program "take" rates for paygrade E6
by rating group and LOS. The aviation rating group has the highest percentage take
rate for the base case LOS, (16.8 percent). For this base case person, the rating
group with the highest VSI take rate is the aviation rating group with 17 years of
service. The lowest VSI take rate is for the seamanship rating group, which is lower
than the actual take rate up to LOS 17, where the take rate is 16.5 percent.
TABLE 18
PREDICTED TAKE RATE FOR PAYGRADE E5
BY RATING GROUP AND LENGTH OF SERVICE
LOS
10 11 12 13a 14 15 16 17
RATEGRUP
ADMIN 20.5 21.1 21.8 22.4 23.1 23.8 24.4 25.1
AVIATION 18.8 17.2 15.6 14.2 12.9 11.7 10.6 95
COMBAT 27.6 25.3 23.1 21.0 19.1 17.4 15.7 14.2
MECHANICAL 19.0 19.3 19.6 19.9 20.2 20.5 20.8 21.1
SEAMANSHP 18.0 18.2 183 18.5 18.6 18.8 18.9 19.1
SUPPORT 16.1 15.9 15.8 15.7 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.2
TECHNICAL 26.5 24.5 22.7 21.0 19.4 17.9 16.4 15.1
NOTE: a LOS 13 is Base Case
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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TABLE 19
PREDICTED TAKE RATE FOR PAYGRADE E6
BY RATING GROUP AND LENGTH OF SERVICE
LOS
10 11 12 13" 14 15 16 17
RATEGRUP
ADMIN 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.5 9.9 10.2 10.6 10.9
AVIATION 13.1 11.8 10.7 9.7 8.7 7.9 7.1 6.4
COMBAT 18.5 16.7 15.1 13.7 12.3 11.1 10.0 9.0
MECHANICAL 10.2 10.4 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.5
SEAMANSHIP 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4
SUPPORT 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.5
TECHNICAL 16.4 15.1 13.9 12.7 11.6 10.6 9.7 8.9
NOTE: a LOS 13 is Base Case
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
TABLE 20
PREDICTED TAKE RATE FOR VSI FOR PAYGRADE E5
BY RATING GROUP AND LENGTH OF SERVICE
LOS
10 11 12 13" 14 15 16 17
RATEGRUP
ADMRATNG 4.9 6.4 8.3 10.6 13.5 17.1 21.4 26.4
AVRATING 6.2 8.4 11.2 14.8 19.4 25.0 31.5 38.8
COMRATNG 8.0 10.2 13.0 16.3 20.3 25.0 30.4 36.3
MECRATNG 4.9 6.8 9.3 12.5 16.8 22.0 28.4 35.8
SMNRATNG 4.9 6.2 7.8 9.7 12.1 14.9 18.3 22.2
SUPRATNG 8.7 10.9 13.6 16.8 20.7 25.1 30.2 35.8
TECRATNG 3.8 5.4 7.6 10.6 14.6 19.8 26.3 33.9
NOTE: * LOS 13 is Base Case
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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TABLE 21
PREDICTED TAKE RATE FOR VSI FOR PAYGRADE E6
BY RATING GROUP AND LENGTH OF SERVICE
LOS
10 11 12 13a 14 15 16 17
RATEGRUP
ADMIN 6.2 8.0 10.3 13.1 16.6 20.8 25.7 313
AVIATION 7.1 9.6 12.7 16.8 21.8 27.8 34.7 42.4
COMBAT 8.2 10.5 13.3 16.7 20.8 25.6 31.0 37.0
MECHANICAL 4.2 5.8 7.9 10.8 14.5 19.3 25.1 32.0
SEAMANSHIP 3.5 4.9 5.5 6.9 8.7 10.8 13.4 16.5
SUPPORT 6.7 8.4 10.6 13.2 16.4 20.2 24.6 29.6
TECHNICAL 4.3 6.2 8.6 12.0 16.5 22.2 29.1 37.3
NOTE: a LOS 13 is Base Case
Source: Derived from data obtained from Bureau of Personnel
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis investigated the factors that influence the decision to voluntarily
separate under one of the two monetary incentive programs, and the choice of which
incentive program to accept. Success in meeting the challenges of the current
personnel reduction depends upon the effective implementation of downsizing
strategies. By making effective use of the voluntary separation incentive programs,
adverse effects of the drawdown on service members and the future force can be
reduced, if not eliminated.
The purpose of the statistical analysis in this thesis was to develop a method
of estimating the acceptance rate for voluntary separation and for a specific incentive
program, in this case VSI. The thesis focused specifically on the results of FY92
VSI/SSB offerings made to enlisted members of the Navy. Results from previous
research on the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) were used as the basis for
forming hypotheses of the effect of monetary separation bonuses on separation
behavior.
The multivariate logit model was explained and used to specify empirical
regression models of the separation decision. The categories of specific variables
used in the estimating equation included basic demographic factors, Navy experience
and other background factors, and eligibility requirements. Multivariate logit
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regression models were estimated to obtain the direction and magnitude of the effect
of each explanatory variable on the decision to accept/reject a voluntary separation
incentive bonus when it is offered. The models estimated the partial effect of the
separation bonus program on the probability of acceptance among service members
who are eligible, holding constant other factors.
The analysis performed in this thesis was primarily concerned with determining
which factors were statistically significantly influences on the individual's decision.
While the signs of the coefficients of most variables were consistent with initial
expectations, there were significant differences in the magnitude and level of
significance between the model explaining the separation decision and the model
explaining the choice of program. This suggests that the factors that influence the
decision of whether or not to voluntarily separate are different from those that
influence the choice of type of payment, a lump sum versus an annuity.
Factors that the Navy can control will be the most important in the successful
implementation of future rounds of offerings. These factors are the length of service,
paygrade and rating of the service member. Length of service is a statistically
significant variable in both the separation and choice decision models. Results
indicate that the greater the length of service, the less likely service members are to
accept voluntary separation. However, once the separation decision has been made,
service members with more time in are more likely to choose VSI.
Paygrade is statistically significant in the decision to separate model; however,
it is not significant in the choice decision. In the decision to voluntarily separate,
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paygrade is one of the most significant indicators of behavior. In particular, those
in the higher paygrades were shown to be less likely to voluntarily separate.
The rating dummy variables were all significant in the decision to voluntarily
separate model. However, except for the seamanship ratings, they are statistically
insignificant in the choice of program. Results indicate that compared to the combat
rating group all other rating groups are less likely to choose to voluntarily separate.
This finding does not support the expectation of combat rating groups being the
group with the most organization-specific skills and therefore the least likely to
choose to voluntarily separate.
Results of cross-tabulations indicated that the highest take rates, not suprisingly
fell within the same rating groups that had the highest percentage of personnel who
were offered voluntary separation. With respect to the choice decision, the highest
VSI take rates were in the LOS 14-15 cell for all but the seamanship rating group.
However, the VSI take rate in the LOS 16-17 cell dropped off dramatically for all
rating groups.
This lower take rate for VSI in the higher LOS cell may be correlated with the
different non-pecuniary benefits packages that were being offered with the programs
in the FY92 rounds. (See Appendix) The SSB package offered non-pecuniary
benefits that are similar in type and number to those offered at retirement and may
have been perceived as worth more than the additional monetary compensation paid
by the VSI program.
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The benefits packages offered with the two programs also appear to have
impacted the effect of various demographic characteristics on the program choice
decision. Married service members and those with children tended to select the SSB
program, which offered the most extensive benefits, to assist in the transition to a
new civilian job and lifestyle. These include benefits important to service members
with family responsibilities such as exchange and commissary privileges, health care,
and use of military housing. Another benefit useful to service members with family
responsibilities is the priority for National Guard and Reserve affiliation, which could
mean additional or interim income after separation. Service members who do not
have to rely on transition benefits because they are married to military members and
will remain eligible for dependent benefits, and single members with no family
responsibilities, tended to choose the VSI program.
Percentages of high school graduates in the "taker" population for all rating
groups are less than in the overall eligible population, indicating that the Navy is not
losing a disproportionate share of high school graduates. The percentages of
non-high school graduates in the "taker" population for all rating groups exceed the
percentages in the overall eligible population, indicating that the Navy is
disproportionately separating non-high school graduates.
The variable for time left on current enlistment contract is one of the most
significant variables in the decision to voluntarily separate. As years left on the
current enlistment contract increase, service members are less likely to accept
voluntary separation. This result indicates that service members who have time to
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wait for a better offer, or to wait and see what an uncertain future might bring, do
so.
One aspect of the drawdown that is of concern to manpower planners is
possible side-effects of the downsizing strategies on retention. The normal response
when offered a monetary incentive to separate, in a RIF environment, is to accept
the separation bonus before being laid off. During FY92 the Navy put forth great
effort to assure it's personnel that RIFs would not be used to meet personnel
reductions, removing an important motivation to accepting voluntary separation.
The Navy experienced increased retention during the FY92 downsizing. This could
be a combination of the reinforcement of job security by Navy officials and
perceptions of current civilian employment opportunities.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In each of the four successive FY92 rounds (Phases I - IV) the length of service
requirement was progressively widened. In this analysis, however, the four phases
could not be analyzed separately to determine the effect of length of service on the
decision to separate. Thus, the data represents an aggregation over all four rounds
of FY92 and mirror the average behavior for the year. It is believed that this
average yields representative results in terms of the direction and magnitude of
effects that separate analyses of the individual phases would have yielded. The phase
fields are available in the original VSI/SSB data set obtained from the ADP section
of BUPERS (PERS-10). Further analysis of the data set used in this thesis by phase
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could confirm and reinforce the findings of this study with regard to the effect of
length of service on the dependent variable.
A study of FY93 offerings is also needed to assess the effect of the
non-pecuniary benefits packages on the choice decision. In each of the four rounds
of FY92, the benefits packages were different for the two programs. In the FY93
Defense Authorization Act, the benefits package for VSI was changed to include
those benefits previously offered only with the SSB program. Thus, the benefits
packages attached to both programs were equalized. If the data for the FY93 rounds
were obtained and put into the same format as the data set analyzed in this thesis,
comparison of the results under the different non-pecuniary benefits packages could
be made; and confirmation of the inferences drawn here with respect to the program
choice could be made.
A study using survey data could shed more light on the factors behind the
decision of service members to voluntarily separate. Many of the influences on a
retention/separation decision are non-quantifiable, personal taste choice factors. For
example, survey data could help determine the general satisfaction level of service
members with the military, a factor which has been shown by previous research to
have an effect on the retention decision [Ref. 15].
One area that needs attention is a review of the eligible ratings that were
targeted by enlisted manpower planners. Rating eligibility was restricted to regular
active duty enlisted personnel. Included in the data set obtained from BUPERS are
56 service members in ratings that have enlisted community codes of S and T, which
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are Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) communities. Of the 56 eligible
members that were coded as TAR's, 48 were approved for separation under VSI or
SSB, 9 S-community, 39 T-community. These individuals may have been miscoded.
By cross-referencing the EMCCODE variable with social security number, these
individuals can be separated from the original data set and a check of eligibility can
be made.
Finally, this thesis could not show conclusively that the historical overall
separation rate would not have increased in the absence of the voluntary separation
incentive programs. Because the Navy was under the least serious threat of RIF of
the four services, it is a reasonable assumption that historical continuation/separation
behavior would have prevailed, even in the absence of the monetary incentive
separation programs. If this assumption is correct, the take rates found in this
analysis will show the net effect of monetary separation incentive programs on
separation behavior, and not a related effect of the reduction-in-force environment.
The VSI and SSB programs provide the ability to specifically target overmanned
ratings and ratings that are being phased out because of the changing missions of the
Navy, and to target specific lengths of service in order to provide those who remain
in the shrinking force with continued opportunity for promotion. Because of these
applications, future use of voluntary separation incentive programs will be useful.
Considering the possibility that all service members interested in a voluntary
separation bonus program would have accepted and separated in the first rounds, the
question of whether or not the VSI/SSB can be used again successfully is an
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important one. With the change in domestic political parties in power, the threat of
RIF and perception of job security remain uncertain. The threat of RIF is a strong
motivation. Personnel will be assessing their options and opportunities for future
service until final decisions on the size, composition and mission of the military have
been made. The constantly changing international environment and current domestic
political climate will have major impacts on such issues as the "Base Force" and
future mission definition for the U.S. military. Continuing research will be required
to assess the fairness and effectiveness of actions taken, and implications for the
future force, when further reductions are required.
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APPENDIX
LISTING OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ELIGIBILITY BY LOS,
RATING AND PAYGRADE
10JAN92 - ALNAV announcing FY92 participation in VSI/SSB
programs
Benefit programs were originally designed as indicated
below. In the FY93 Defense Authorization Act the benefit
packages were redesigned to contain the same benefits across
all separation programs. The addition of benefits was also
made retroactive so that all personnel who opted to
voluntarily separate under VSI recieved the same benefits as
those who chose SSB.







Up to 12 days after SEP
Two-Year Commisary and
Exchange Priviledges
Extended Use of DoDDS
Schools (Overseas only
and if DEPNS have completed













Ten Days Permissive TDY and (X)
Excess Leave for Relocation
Transition
Priority Reserve and National (X)
Guard Affiliation Within One Year
Of SEP
Extended Use of Military (X)









(X) Benefits added in FY93 Authorization Act
13 JAN 92 1st Round announced










































NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 7821 ONLY
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707 NOT
NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707 NOT
15 16
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC OOOO, 8404 ONLY

















































































NEC 1801 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT
NEC 2313, 2318-19, 2346 NOT
NEC 2313, 2318-19, 2346 NOT
NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE
29 FEB 92 - NAVADMIN MSG announcing SECOND Phase - VSI/SSB
programs FY92
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NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 6628, 6650, 6689 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 7821 ONLY
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
NEC 0000, 8707 ONLY
NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707 NOT
NEC 4613-16, 4621, 4631-32, 4666,
4668-69, 4671-73, 4707 NOT
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC OOOO, 8404 ONLY
NEC OOOO, 8404 ONLY


















































NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918 NOT
NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215-16 NOT
NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE
10 APR 92 - NAVADMIN MSG announcing THIRD Phase - VSI/SSB
programs FY92
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4632, 4671-73, 4707 NOT
EM2 10 17


















NEC 282 4 NOT ELIGIBLE





NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6644, 6650, 6689
6695 NOT ELIGIBLE
NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 6650,
6695 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 7821 ONLY
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 8753 AND 87 65 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 8753 AND 87 65 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4626,
ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 4626,
ELIGIBLE
NEC 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 3307 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC OOOO, 8404 ONLY
NEC OOOO, 8404 ONLY
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IC(SS)1 12 17






LI 2 10 17
MM(SS) 1 12 17
MM(SS) 2 10 17





















0167, 0215 -16 NOT ELIGIBLE
QM2 10 17


















NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1801, 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
NEC 3317, 3319 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 3317, 3319 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918
NEC 1801, 1820-21, 1918
NOT
NOT
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 0261,
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 0161,
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY.
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2824
NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2824
NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0418, 0419 NOT ELIGIBLE
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NOTE 1. INELIGIBLE AIRCREW NECS : 8203, 8215, 8226, 8235-38,
8251-52, 8262, 8284.
05 JUN 92 - NAVADMIN MSG announcing FOURTH Phase - VSI/SSB
programs FY92

















6659, 6689 , 6695 NOT EL
AW1 10 17
7873, 7876 NOT ELIGIBLE
AW2 13 17

























NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 2824 NOT ELIGIBLE
NOTE 1. NEC 7222, 8305, 8331 NOT
ELIGIBLE




NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 6650,
LE
NOTE 1. NEC 6628, 6633, 6650,
LE
NEC 7815, 7825-27, 7841, 7846,
NEC 7815, 7825-27, 7841, 7846,
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 0161, 0167, 0215, 0216 NOT
NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 8753 AND 8765 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 4707 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 4707 NOT ELIGIBLE








1121, 1127 ,1143--44 NOT
FC2 10 17








































0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
QM2 10 17
0167, 0215-16 NOT ELIGIBLE
RM1 10 17
RM2 10 17
NEC 14TG, 1420, 1428, 1450 NOT
NEC 17 34 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1734 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1102-08, 1114-15, 1118-19,
ELIGIBLE
NEC 1102-08, 1114-15, 1118-19,
ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0878, 0879 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0981 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC OOOO, 84 04 ONLY
NEC OOOO, 84 04 ONLY
NEC 4709, 4711-12, 4721, 4745,
NEC 4709, 4711-12, 4721, 4745,
NEC 1821 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1820-21 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY
NEC 1821, 1918 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 1820-21, 1918 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 7352,7353 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 7352,7353 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC CQfiL,
























NEC 3111 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 3111 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2 824
NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2824
NEC 0401, 0407, 0410, 0414-17,
0488, 0490 NOT
NEC 0418, 0419, 0422 NOT ELIGIBLE
NEC 0418, 0419, 0422 NOT ELIGIBLE
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2514
SURFACE COMPONENT ONLY. NEC 2514
NOTE 1. INELIGIBLE AIRCREW NECS
:
8251-52, 8262, 8284.
8203, 8215, 8226, 8235-38,
102
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Grier, Peter, "Shaving The Force," Government Executive . April 1990, pp.
36-39.
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P), Memorandum dated 16 JAN 1991,
for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Regulations on a
Uniform Process for Implementing Strength Reductions.
3. Beland, Russell W., U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Retirement,
Voluntary Separations, and the Reduction of the Armed Forces," Social
Science Quarterly. Volume 73, Number 2, June 1992.
4. Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P), Memorandum dated 18 MAY 1992,
for Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject:
VSI/SSB Assessment Report.
5. Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P), Memorandum dated 3 Jan 1992 for
Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Voluntary Separation
Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) Policy Guidance.
6. Kozlowski, S. W. J., Chao, G. T., Smith, E. M., Heglund, J. A., Walz, P. M.,
Organizational Downsizing: Individual and Organizational Implications and
Recommendations for Action . United States Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Services, Technical Report 929, June 1991.
7. Cameron, Kim S., Sutton, Robert I., and Whetten, David A., Editors,
Readings in Organizational Decline: Frameworks. Research and
Prescriptions . Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.
8. Cymrot, D. J., The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses on Retention.
Center for Naval Analysis, CRM 87-43, March 1987.
9. Behn, Robert D., Tlie Fundamentals of Cutback Management, Readings in
Organizational Decline: Frameworks. Research and Prescriptions . Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 347-356.
10. American Management Association, 1992 AMA SURVEY ON
DOWNSIZING. Summary of Key Findings . AMA NEWS.
103
11. Tomasko, Robert M., DOWNSIZING Reshaping the Corporation for the
Future . AMACOM, 1987.
12. Perry, Lee Tom, Least-Cost Alternatives to Layoffs in Declining Industries,
Readings in Organizational Decline: Frameworks. Research and
Prescriptions . Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 357-368.
13. Hosek, J. R., Peterson, C. E., Reenlistment Bonuses and Retention
Behavior. Executive Summary. RAND Corporation, R-3199/1-MIL, May
1985.
14. Tinney, R., The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses. Part I:
Background and Theoretical Issues . U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, ARI Research Note 91-83, June 1991.
15. Lempe, S. J., A Multivariate Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Retention
of First and Second Term Air Force Enlisted Members. Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1989.
16. Hosek, James R., Peterson, Christine E., Reenlistment Bonuses and
Retention Behavior. Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense/Manpower, Installations and Logistics, RAND Corporation,
R-3199-MIL, March 1985.
17. Higham, R. P., A Multiple Linear Regression Model for Predicting Zone A
Retention by Military Occupational Specialty. Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 1986.
18. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1 160.6A,
Enlisted Bonus and Special Duty Assignment Pay Programs . 28 May 1987.
19. Siggerud, D., Retention Intention Among U.S. Navy's Enlisted Personnel:
An Analysis of Social. Environmental, and Economical Factors . Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1981.
20. Ehrenberg, R.G., and Smith, R.S., Modern Labor Economics. Theory and
Public Policy. Third Edition, 1988.
21. Bepko, John J., Econometric Models of U. S. Navy Career Petty Officer
Retention . Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, June 1981.
104
22. Eitelberg, Mark J., Manpower for Military Occupations . Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), April
1988.
23. Gujarati, D. N., Basic Econometrics . Second Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1988.
24. Wright, P.M., Marginal Probabilities: An Intuitive Alternative to Logistic
Regression Coefficients . The John Hopkins University.
25. NAVY TIMES, Profile of the Military (Supplement), p. P12, September, 7,
1992.
26. SAS/STAT User's Guide. Volume 2. GLM-VARCOMP . Version 6 Fourth
Edition, SAS Institute, 1990.
105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002









Department of the Navy
Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS 23)
Washington, D.C. 20370-5000
6. LCDR Barbara Transki
Department of the Navy
Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS 222)
Washington, D.C. 20370-5000
7. LT Mary A. Kirby
433 Forest St.
Eau Claire, Wisconsin 54703




GAYIORD S

